The Indian Panorama

Tag: Nirupama Subramanian

  • Trump’s Peace Board raises old questions

    Trump’s Peace Board raises old questions

    As India ponders Trump’s invite to join the Board of Peace, here’s a recall of Vajpayee’s refusal to send troops in support of Iraq invasion.

    “Trump is far more ambitious than Bush, a different creature altogether. Diplomacy has no place in his narcissistic schemes. It is not too late for India to find its voice, just as the Vajpayee government did two decades ago, to stand up to Trump and say no to his new plan to reshape the world in his image. In doing so, India may even inspire others to call out the plan for what it is and decline the invitation categorically.”

    By Nirupama Subramanian

    The Board of Peace established by US President Donald Trump has so far found few takers. Invitations have reportedly gone out to 60 countries, asking them to join “an international organization that seeks to promote stability, restore dependable and lawful governance, and secure enduring peace in areas affected or threatened by conflict.” Quite clearly, it is not the same Board of Peace that was envisaged in Trump’s facile 20-point Gaza peace plan. That one was to be a transitional body, headed by Trump, to supervise a proposed interim, technocratic Palestinian committee for the day-to-day running of Gaza. The UNSC endorsed the idea and gave the Board a two-year mandate.

    This one is entirely different. Trump sees it as a free-range body, unrestricted by national boundaries or questions of sovereignty, to intervene in situations of conflict around the world, all under his leadership. With his offer of “permanent seats” to countries that will pay a membership fee of $1 billion, Trump does not see the body as bound by any UN rules, much less the UNSC’s two-year mandate that is due to end in November 2027.

    France has let on that it does not intend to join this latest of Trump’s many unilateral moves to reshape the world in his image. Canada’s PM Mark Carney has said he was prepared to consider it “on principle”, but he will not pay for membership.

    India has received the invitation, too, and is reported to be weighing its options, like most other nations facing this googly. It is worth remembering that this is not the first time that India has been invited to join a US-led coalition to carry out the agenda of the president-in-office at the time.

    The pressure the US brought to send soldiers to Iraq in 2003 is no secret. Admittedly, today’s US under its current President is unrecognizable from the one 22 years ago, and the geopolitics is far more complex today. But then, so was India not half the country it is today, nor did its leadership flaunt itself as Vishwaguru. The story of how Delhi held its nerve during those tense months serves as a useful reminder of a time when Raisina Hill was able to stiffen its back and hold its own in tough circumstances.

    When George W Bush invaded Iraq on the double lie that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and that he was in cahoots with Osama bin Laden, the US-India romance was in its early stages.

    On March 19, 2003, without explicit authorization from the Security Council, the US and the UK carried out what they called a “pre-emptive” attack on Iraq. Earlier, in an effort to build an international “coalition of the willing” for the war, the US had asked 50 countries — India was not in this list — to assist it in the endeavor, hoping in this way to build international legitimacy.

    Only 30 responded, and apparently 15 others wanted their names to not be listed publicly. Britain sent 45,000 troops, while Australia and Poland also sent small numbers of ground forces. Others gave assistance in a non-combat capacity.

    It was only weeks after Bush declared in May 2003 that the US mission in Iraq had been accomplished that the US approached India for a division of troops (around 18,000 soldiers) to work under the overall command of the two occupying powers, the US and the UK, and help “stabilize” the situation.

    The Indian Parliament had “deplored” (rather than the stronger “condemned’) the invasion of Iraq and called the US military action “unacceptable”. The Vajpayee government’s response to the US request for assistance — that it had good relations with both the US and Iraq, and therefore would take the “middle path” — saw US diplomacy swing into action.

    The US envoy in India, Robert Blackwill, who enjoyed enormous goodwill and access in Delhi, and other especially dispatched Bush emissaries worked on the government. In an interview to The Hindu, Blackwill spoke of a “major role” for India on the “inner board of directors” that would be in charge of security in Iraq during its transition to democracy. Blackwill projected that India’s role on the security side would also give it influence on the political and diplomatic aspects of the transition.

    When Home Minister LK Advani visited the US in early June, President Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld spoke to him on the subject of India sending soldiers to Iraq. Advani made no commitment. His visit was followed by the arrival of Pentagon officials in India. The strategic community was divided. Those who supported sending troops said it would help India break out of its “South Asia box” and increase its standing in the world.

    The late B Raman, who retired as head of the counter-terrorism division of the Research and Analysis Wing, warned of dire consequences. “Indian troops will get sucked into a bloody counter-insurgency operation as the surrogates of the U.S., losing whatever goodwill India had earned in Iraq and the rest of the Arab world in the past,” Raman wrote warning that “a new breed of jehadi terrorists born out of the Iraq war” would start targeting India, making the domestic counter-terrorism challenge even tougher.

    Finally, on July 14, 2003, India announced it would not send troops to Iraq without a UN mandate. “The Government of India has given careful thought to the question of sending Indian troops to Iraq. Our longer term national interest, our concern for the people of Iraq, our long-standing ties with the Gulf region as a whole, as well as our growing dialogue and strengthened ties with the US have been key elements in this consideration.

    India remains ready to respond to the urgent needs of the Iraqi people for stability, security, political progress and economic reconstruction. Were there to be an explicit UN mandate for the purpose, the Government of India could consider the deployment of our troops in Iraq.”

    India refused to send troops even after the October 2003 UNSC Resolution 1511, “authorizing a multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.” Delhi said it could not send troops due to the situation in Kashmir, but pledged $10 million for Iraqi reconstruction.

    Trump is far more ambitious than Bush, a different creature altogether. Diplomacy has no place in his narcissistic schemes. It is not too late for India to find its voice, just as the Vajpayee government did two decades ago, to stand up to Trump and say no to his new plan to reshape the world in his image. In doing so, India may even inspire others to call out the plan for what it is and decline the invitation categorically.
    (Nirupama Subramanian is a senior journalist)

  • Adani ripples in the neighborhood

    Adani ripples in the neighborhood

    “Over the last few years, as the Adani juggernaut struck deals in the neighborhood, apparently with help from the topmost echelons in Delhi, the government shook off the controversies and saw this as a no-brainer in a tough region where it has to rival China for influence and money power. The deals were controversial. Their review in Dhaka and Colombo after dramatic changes of government in both capitals, with the US indictment of Gautam Adani and others in his companies on charges of bribery strengthening public and political sentiment against them, should make it clear they were never cool.”

    By Nirupama Subramanian

    For several decades of the 20th century, American diplomacy in its neighborhood was identified with a US multinational called the United Fruit Company (UFC). How the UFC influenced the economies of Central America and even orchestrated a coup with the CIA in Guatemala to protect its interests is a story of ‘banana republics’ too well-known to recount here. India now has its own version of this story, with a twist in the tale.

    Over the last few years, as the Adani juggernaut struck deals in the neighborhood, apparently with help from the topmost echelons in Delhi, the government shook off the controversies and saw this as a no-brainer in a tough region where it has to rival China for influence and money power. The deals were controversial. Their review in Dhaka and Colombo after dramatic changes of government in both capitals, with the US indictment of Gautam Adani and others in his companies on charges of bribery strengthening public and political sentiment against them, should make it clear they were never cool.

    In Bangladesh, Adani Power Jharkhand Ltd, which sends electricity to that country from a coal-fired thermal plant in the specially created Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Godda (Jharkhand), has been in the eye of a storm since December 2022. Seven years earlier, during his June 2015 visit to Dhaka, PM Narendra Modi pushed to “widen the cooperation” between the two countries in the power sector. According to the joint statement from the visit, Modi, lauding the efforts of Sheikh Hasina, then Bangladesh PM, to achieve a higher installed power capacity, “conveyed that India can be a major partner in achieving this goal and many Indian corporates have the capacity to cooperate with Bangladesh in this endeavor”. He requested Hasina to facilitate “the entry of Indian companies in the power generation, transmission and distribution sector of Bangladesh”.

    Gautam Adani was in the PM’s delegation. In August 2015, Adani Power Limited signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) for exporting 1,600 megawatts of electricity. In 2017, the deal was finalized and signed in Bangladesh under the Quick Enhancement of Electricity and Energy Supply (Special Provisions) Act, 2010, enabling Dhaka to bypass the requirement of floating tenders.

    In India, Jharkhand silenced local protest to ‘secure consent’ from landowners across several villages in Godda district. Two months ahead of the 2019 elections, the Central Government fast-tracked approval for the SEZ, which would enable Rs 14,000 crore to export the electricity generated at the plant. When Hasina visited India in August 2022, Adani called on her at Delhi, tweeting later that the plant would begin the transmission of 1,500 MW from Bijoy Dibosh, December 16, Bangladesh’s liberation anniversary.

    With the terms of the agreement shrouded in secrecy, the Adani-BPDB agreement was hardly known until a Washington Post report revealed that Bangladesh would purchase Adani electricity at an exorbitant price. Outrage at the one-sided agreement fed into the public anger against Hasina. Ahead of the 2024 elections, some media reports projected Hasina’s agreement to the deal as quid pro quo for the Modi government’s continued support. Inevitably, it was one of the first bilateral deals to come under the scanner after Hasina’s ouster.

    In Sri Lanka, Adani made a trip to Colombo in October 2021 to meet then President Gotabaya Rajapaksa soon after Adani Ports signed a deal to develop and run Colombo Port’s West Container Terminal. By then, Sri Lanka’s economic woes had surfaced, and the President was being advised by insiders, including his brother Basil, to reach out to India for assistance. Gotabaya recorded the Adani visit as a meeting with “an old Indian friend”. The head of the Ceylon Electricity Board announced that the visiting Indian tycoon was interested in green energy investments. Adani was flown to the north-western Mannar district in a Sri Lanka Air Force plane to inspect a wind farm.

    Six months later, in March 2022, Sri Lanka’s The Sunday Times was the first to report that the country had signed an MoU to set up two renewable energy projects in Mannar district and at Pooneryn in Killinochi district. The terms of the agreement, signed between the Lankan Government and the Adani Group on March 12, were not made public. The MoU was signed at a time when the Sri Lankan economy was in meltdown, the streets were filled with protesters and India was helping Colombo with credit lines and other financial assistance to tide over a full-blown crisis. In a down-and-out country, news of the Adani deal added to the public sentiment that India’s assistance came with a price tag. Later in 2022, that sentiment got a new wind when the Ceylon Electricity Board chairman revealed that he was ordered by President Rajapaksa to sign off on the unsolicited project because “he [Rajapaksa] was under pressure from Modi”. Rajapaksa denied the statement attributed to him. The official retracted the statement and resigned, but the matter was hardly forgotten.

    In 2023, more outrage followed the Sri Lankan Government’s announcement that it would convert the project into a ‘government to government’ agreement to get around the rule of competitive bids for such projects. Earlier this year, then President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s government announced a 20-year $440-million agreement with the Adani Group for the proposed wind farms. However, environmentalists and local residents have petitioned the Supreme Court against the project, citing a lack of transparency in awarding the project and high tariff rates.

    Prior to his election, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake had declared that he would scrap the project. At the last court hearing on October 15, he requested that the hearings be put off until after the parliamentary elections, when his government could review the deal. The next hearing is reported to be in March 2025. Meanwhile, last week’s damaging indictment may hurt Adani’s Colombo port project too. The US Development Finance Corporation, which had announced in 2023 an investment of $550 million in the West Container Terminal, has said that it is still “conducting due diligence” of the project.

    For India, the damage is more than just reputational. Instead of strutting in lockstep with a businessman, Delhi mandarins should have seen the risks of nurturing an Indian ‘United Fruit Company’ to the country’s national interest, especially its strategic objectives in the neighborhood. Instead, they shrugged their shoulders and called it a win-win. Many in India believe that the Modi government can do a deal with Trump that will let Adani off the hook. Maybe, though what it will cost India is not clear. The reckoning, as it unfolds in the neighborhood, will be even more difficult.
    (The author is National Editor (Strategic Affairs). She writes on India’s foreign policy and national security issues)