The Indian Panorama

Tag: Afghanistan

  • African Sahel Regional Drought

    African Sahel Regional Drought

    In May, eight countries in West Africa suffered from a devastating lack of rainfall. This absence of rain came at a critical time in the growing season there. Failed crops and an insect plague have created painfully high food prices, leaving more than 18 million people to face hunger across western Africa. To put numbers on this situation, Chad and Mauritania have recorded a loss in crop yield of over 50% when compared to last year’s yield records.

    Iran and Afghanistan were struck with two of the most deadly earthquakes of 2012. On August 11, 306 people died from the 6.4 magnitude quake that struck East Azerbaijan Province, Iran. This earthquake was in the rural and mountainous areas to the northeast of Tabriz, and was felt as far away as Armenia. Iran’s major seismic fault lines make the country prone to much worse earthquakes than this one. A 2003 quake killed approximately 26,000, while a 1990 earthquake may have killed as many as 50,000 in Iran. The third-worst earthquake of the year happened in a neighboring part of the Middle East, on June 11. The Baghlan province of Afghanistan sustained a pair of 5.4 and 5.7 magnitude earthquakes, which killed 75 people in that region.

  • Worst Natural Disasters Of 2012

    Worst Natural Disasters Of 2012

    2012 saw many natural disasters strike across the globe, killing thousands and inflicting billions of dollars in property and infrastructural damage. From hurricanes and earthquakes to droughts, heat waves and wildfires, events were both widespread and severe. Hurricane Sandy was one of the most prominent disasters of the year in the U.S., killing at least 125 people and inflicting at least $62 billion in damage, according to the Associated Press. The storm also killed 71 people in the Caribbean. Much of the U.S. was also plagued by prolonged extreme weather.

    The country saw a severe summer heat wave and a drought which may prove more costly than Sandy. Researchers note that the 2012 drought is the worst since 1988 and is on par with those of the 1950s. The drought came amid a year which, by mid-December, had an over 99 percent chance of being the warmest ever recorded for the U.S. In the American West, the 2012 wildfire season had already burned 30 percent more area than in an average year by September, “with nearly two months still to go in the fire season,” according to Climate Central. They note, “In the past 40 years, rising spring and summer temperatures, along with shrinking winter snowpack, have increased the risk of wildfires in most parts of the West.”

    Recent computer modeling and satellite observations suggest the area burned by wildfires in the U.S. will likely double by 2050. Researchers and officials noted that many of the extreme weather events which hit the U.S. this year were predicted in previous years by climate scientists. U.S. National Weather Service acting director Laura Furgione said, according to AP, “The normal has changed, I guess. The normal is extreme.” Around the world, major earthquakes struck in Italy, the Philippines, Iran, and Afghanistan. The Philippines were also slammed by Typhoon Bopha, which claimed over 1,000 lives and left many more homeless.

  • Pak Strategy: Deny India Nuclear Victory

    Pak Strategy: Deny India Nuclear Victory

    Pakistan’s relations with two of its neighbors-India and Afghanistan – are strained, and a third border, with Iran, marks the Sunni-Shia divide within Islam. Domestic social services are in decline. Governance is widely conceded to be poor at both the national and provincial level. Many extremist groups have found shelter in Pakistan.

    Some fight the military, others have colluded with it. Over the past five years, Pakistan ranks second (only to Iraq) in the incidence of mass-casualty deaths due to sectarian and politicallyinspired domestic violence.

    Amidst these indicators of national decline – and in the face of concerted efforts by the US and other nations to prevent Pakistan from crossing key production thresholds — Pakistan now possesses a considerable and growing nuclear arsenal, which is publicly estimated to include perhaps 90-110 weapons.

    It is hard to identify another governmental or military enterprise in contemporary Pakistan that has been more successful in identifying goals and implementing them than Pakistan’s nuclear weapon-related programs. Most Pakistanis who bemoan the problems they face in everyday life feel pride in the accomplishments of testing and producing nuclear weapons. They begrudge governmental corruption and incompetence, but not money spent on the Bomb.

    Start of N-pursuit
    Pakistan’s serious pursuit of nuclear weapons began with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who famously declared in 1965 — well before taking charge of the country and the program that his compatriots would “eat grass” and suffer other deprivations in order to possess nuclear weapons. This priority became more focused after the 1971 war with India that resulted in Pakistan’s grave humiliation, vivisection, and Bhutto’s ascendancy as President, and subsequently, as Prime Minister.

    Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a powerful political figure who became President of Pakistan from 1988 to 1993, provided continuity of oversight over the nuclear program after Bhutto’s demise and during a period of revolving Prime Ministers. As with other nuclear programs in other countries, “first generation” scientists in defense establishments also played key roles in nuclear development programs, most notably Munir Khan and Samar Mubarakmand of Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission and A.Q. Khan of the Khan Research Laboratories.

    The transfer of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon-related programs to military control was realized in stages, beginning with the imprisonment in 1977 and subsequent execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto by General Zia-ul-Haq. Military supremacy in all military-related nuclear matters was reaffirmed after Ghulam Ishaq Khan’s forced resignation from the Presidency in 1993, and was consolidated further when, in February, 2000, then-Chief Executive and Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, implemented plans for a directorate to focus on operational issues — the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) at Joint Staff Headquarters — that the recently deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had dawdled over.

    High-end nuclear strikes
    While high-end Pakistani nuclear strike packages probably include some military targets, the standard way for new nuclearweapon states to define minimal, credible deterrence is by means of counter-value targeting, i.e., being able to destroy an adversary’s large metropolitan areas. There are ten cities in India with populations over three million: Mumbai, Delhi, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Ahmedabad, Chennai, Kolkata, Surat, Pune, and Jaipur.

    Mumbai is a centre of commerce, culture, and nuclear infrastructure. New Delhi is the seat of government. Chennai and Kolkata are significant regional hubs. Bangalore and Hyderabad represent the new, “rising” India, fueling India’s economic growth. Placing these cities, some of which contain very significant Muslim populations, at risk is one way to check perceived Indian designs on Pakistan’s territorial integrity.

    This analysis hypothesizes very modest requirements for Pakistani counter-value targeting. Assuming ten cities and three weapons per city, thirty weapons delivered on targets would be required. These numbers are notional; they may vary from city to city and could be revised upward or downward. Those responsible in Pakistan for planning counter-value targeting against Indian cities would also have to assume losses of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and storage sites to Indian preemptive or retaliatory strikes.

    Consequently, if there is a fixed requirement for the laydown of a certain number of weapons against Indian cities, a multiple of this number would presumably be applied to compensate for expected losses. In any event, counter-value strikes against Indian cities could entail a very substantial use of nuclear weapons.

    All of these planning factors are closely held, so this assessment is highly conjectural. Indian leaders and hawkish analysts have expressed the view that their country could survive a nuclear war, whereas Pakistan would not.

    As former Defense Minister George Fernandes said in a 2002 interview, “[I]f he should finally take that kind of step, perhaps out of desperation, he should realize that India can survive a nuclear attack, but Pakistan cannot.” Army Chief S. Padmanabhan echoed these sentiments when he reportedly said that “India would severely punish any state that is ‘mad enough to use nuclear weapons against any of our assets.’ Padmanabhan added, ‘the perpetrator shall be so severely punished that his very existence will be in doubt. We are ready for a second strike.’” Likewise, hawkish analyst Bharat Karnad wrote, “The problem here is not one of preventing nuclear war, but with believing that Pakistan can annihilate India, which is not possible, even as the reverse is eminently true.”

    A targeting doctrine
     These assertions have not gone unnoticed by those who set Pakistan’s requirements for nuclear weapons. It would be out of character for Pakistan’s military leadership to accept the survival of India and the death of Pakistan in a nuclear war. Thus, in this conjectural analysis, Rawalpindi is likely to pursue a “victory denial” strategy in the event of a complete breakdown in deterrence.

    The growth of Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile is commensurate with a targeting objective to exact overwhelming damage sufficient to prevent India from recovering as a functioning society. Denying India “victory” in a nuclear war would constitute the high end of Pakistan’s targeting objectives. These might include, in addition to India’s largest cities, its leadership, key industrial facilities, ports, nuclear power plants, dams, and other critical infrastructure that are not necessarily situated in large metropolitan areas.

    A targeting doctrine to deny India victory in a nuclear slugfest would be an unusual and exacting way to define minimal, credible deterrence, but it could well explain Pakistan’s production capacity for nuclear weapons and the prospective growth of its stockpile. Peter R. Lavoy has argued that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence strategy is predicated on a commitment to “escalation dominance.” During the Cold War, hawkish US strategists held the view that victory was still possible in nuclear exchanges, even at great cost. Failing that, an adversary’s victory could still be denied – and deterrence reaffirmed – by means of expansive nuclear inventories and targeting capabilities.

    Do the managers of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent believe that they can fight and win a nuclear war with India? In their foundational essay, Agha Shahi, Zulfiqar Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar wrote that Pakistan was “not so unrealistic as to entertain” thoughts of the “use of nuclear weapons for war-fighting or seek to develop capability for preemptive attack.” These authors argue that, “India is too large and too well armed to be vulnerable to a disabling strike.” This line of reasoning is reaffirmed as long as India’s strategic assets grow, are properly diversified, become more operationalized for deterrence purposes, and if New Delhi becomes more serious about command and control arrangements.

    It would not require Herculean efforts for Indian leaders to dissuade Rawalpindi that a Pakistani victory in the event of a nuclear war is not achievable.

    A strong case can be made, however, that New Delhi has been lax in assuring retaliatory capabilities and proper force management. While the achievement of victory by Pakistan in a nuclear war with India seems far-fetched, the denial of an Indian victory is another matter.

    The build-up of Pakistan’s nuclear forces is entirely consistent with this objective. Pakistan’s nuclear requirements are set by very few military officers and one retired officer, Lt. General Khalid Kidwai, with very little civilian oversight or ability to question military requirements. After taking charge of the SPD in 2000, Gen. Kidwai was promoted to Lt. General in October, 2001, and then received an extension in service in 2004 to stay at its helm – a highly unusual personnel action. Gen. Kidwai faced retirement in 2005 because his time on active duty would extend beyond those who were about to outrank him.

    His boss, Chief of Army Staff (and President of Pakistan) Pervez Musharraf decided on his retirement, while keeping him in place at the SPD. While many retired military officers have been given plum assignments overseeing civilian institutions in Pakistan, the appointment of a retired military officer to be in charge of a most sensitive joint staff assignment is unprecedented. Gen. Musharraf’s decision survived his banishment from Pakistan. Gen. Kidwai’s extended tenure at the SPD has meant that his views regarding Pakistan’s nuclear requirements will be very hard to overrule. How many other individuals help determine the requirements to implement nuclear doctrine is a matter of conjecture.

    Presumably, a small core group of very senior military officers are instrumental in making such decisions, beginning with the Chief of Army Staff, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, the head of the Strategic Forces Command, and the Chiefs of the Air Force and Navy. A larger group of military officers, scientists, and civil servants provides input to these decisions and implements them.

    Decisions on nuclear matters

    Sitting atop Pakistan’s National Command Authority, which was initially promulgated as an administrative regulation at the outset of Gen. Musharraf’s rule, and then codified into an ordinance nearing the end of his tenure, is the Head of Government. With Musharraf’s exit, the Head of Government became a civilian in the person of President, Asif Ali Zardari. In November, 2009, President Zardari revised this ordnance, placing the Prime Minister, then Yusuf Reza Gilani, at the top of the NCA. This passing of the baton was orchestrated in the context of clarifying the transition from a Presidential- to a Prime Ministerial-led government.

    Under the Musharraf set-up, the Prime Minister served as Vice Chairman of the NCA. Now it appears that the Vice Chairmanship is vacant. Two subsidiary bodies of the NCA – an Employment Control Committee and a Development Control Committee — have Deputy Chairmen. The Deputy Chairman of the all-important Employment Control Committee is the Foreign Minister, a position currently held by Hina Rabbani Khar. The Deputy Chairman of the Development Control Committee is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.

    Three civilian Cabinet Ministers also serve on the Employment Control Committee: the Minister for Defense; the Minister for Interior, and the Minister for Finance. According to an interview Gen. Kidwai gave in 2002, when Gen. Musharraf sat atop the NCA, “practically all (99%) of the nuclear decisions pertain[ed] to the Head of Government.” One can certainly envision that when the Army Chief of Staff sat atop the NCA, he held the ultimate authority in determining employment and developmental decisions relating to nuclear weapons. It would strain credulity to assert that this remains the case under a civilian Head of Government – Prime Minister Gilani, his successor, Raja Pervaiz Ashraf, and under the Deputy Chairmanship of Foreign Minister Khar.

    While notional authority now resides in the office of the Prime Minister, and while Cabinet Ministers on the NCA are involved in these decisions, real authority lies with the Chief of Army Staff, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Kidwai, and a few others, some of whom may not be involved in decision-making under extreme duress.

  • Pakistan Taliban Renews Ceasefire Offer

    Pakistan Taliban Renews Ceasefire Offer

    ISLAMABAD (TIP): The Tehrik-e- Taliban Pakistan has stated that it is willing to declare ceasefire if the Pakistan government withdraws from the US-led war on terror and forms a new foreign policy in accordance to the holy Quran and Sunnah. The Taliban offer came in the form of a letter written to senior Pakistani journalist Salim Safi by Punjabi Taliban’s head Asmatullah Muawiya that was later endorsed by TTP central spokesperson Ihsanullah Ihsan. The Punjabi Taliban, which is affiliated to the TTP, comprises militants with Punjabi background. In a letter Asmatullah says: ‘The Pakistani Taliban follow the Islamic Shariah. The Pakistan Army started the war against us. Still considering them as our own forces, we made a peace deal with it. But the army did not keep its words and (despite the peace agreement) killed Mullah Naik Muhammad (killed in 2004 at Wana).’ ‘The government did not stop there. They took the war to Sararogha from Wana, the headquarters of South Waziristan.

    On US orders, the tribal areas were turned into a battlefield. The tribesmen were massacred. Pakistani agencies handed Dr Aafia Siddiqui (who was later sentenced to 86-year jail term in September 2010 for shooting FBI agents and US army personnel during her arrest in Afghanistan) over to the US. Islamabad [also wrote the bloody episode of Jamia Hafsa and Lal Masjid.” Asmatullah further wrote, ‘It was the Army that forced us to abandon jihad inside Kashmir and Afghanistan to start fighting inside Pakistan.

    For all such fighting, the army and government are responsible and to guard ourselves is our religious right.’ On the ongoing military operation against Taliban, the Taliban leader said: “If forces from 42 countries could not eliminate the Taliban, how can Pakistan hope to win this war?’ Asmatullah put forward three main conditions in front of army and government of Pakistan for restoration peace in the country.

    “The government should make independent foreign policy, withdrawal from the Afghan war and form and implement a new Islamic constitution in the country.” Reacting to the Taliban’s demands, Awami National Party central leader and Railways Minister Ghulam Ahmed Bilour stated that the offer for negotiation is an attempt to create division among political parties. “The statement seemed to be written by some intelligent politician.

    It is an attempt to create divisions among political parties, especially between the ANP and the Muttahida Quami Movement.” Commenting on the peace offer, journalist Rasool Dawar — an expert over Taliban issues, said “There is nothing new in the demands. The Taliban have been making these demands since the day the movement was started.” On whether any ceasefire was possible, Dawar said, “Not at all. Nobody is ready to pay heed to these demands.
    STILL WE WOULD OFFER OUR SERVICES FOR THE COUNTRY UNDER THESE CONDITIONS:

    1)If the Army stops working as mercenaries forces for the US;
    2)The Army becomes a purely Muslim army;
    3)Instead of killing our own people start preparations to avenge the 1971 defeat;
    4)The Army fights for the liberation of Kashmir.’

  • Pak Strategy in Afghanistan Time for hard decisions

    Pak Strategy in Afghanistan Time for hard decisions

    On December 6, Asadullah Khalid, Head of Afghanistan’s intelligence set-up, the National Directorate of Security, was seriously injured in a bomb attack by a Taliban suicide bomber posing as a peace envoy. President Karzai announced the next day that the suicide bomber had come from Pakistan. While not directly naming the ISI, President Karzai described the suicide bombing as a “very sophisticated and complicated act by a professional intelligence service”. Asadullah Khalid is one of President Karzai’s closest aides and has held crucial gubernatorial appointments in Ghazni and Kandahar.

    He had escaped Taliban assassination attempts in 2007 and 2011. He was playing a crucial role in attempts to wean away Pashtun tribal support from the Taliban, as the American “end game” in Afghanistan picks up momentum. Asadullah Khalid is seen as a dangerous adversary in Pakistan. Unlike his Tajik predecessor, Amrollah Saleh, against whom the ISI could whip up Pashtun nationalistic sentiments, he is a blue-blooded Pashtun, who can better deal with Pakistani machinations, which seek to unite Pashtuns under the tutelage of the Mullah Omar-led Quetta Shura and their protégés in the North Waziristanbased Haqqani network.

    In its quest for “strategic depth,” the Pakistan military establishment has based its entire political strategy on pretending to champion the cause of Pashtuns, who constitute 40 per cent of Afghanistan’s population, with the Tajiks constituting 33 per cent of the population and the Shia Hazaras and Uzbeks comprising 11 per cent and 9 per cent, respectively. Interestingly, the language which unites Afghanistan is not Pashtu, which is spoken by 35 per cent of the population and almost exclusively by Pashtuns, but Dari, spoken by 50 per cent of the country’s people.Within the Pashtuns, the ruling class has predominantly been drawn from the landowning Durrani clan. Apart from Nur Mohammed Tarraki and his Soviet-backed successors, the only non-Durrani leader of Afghanistan from the influential Ghilzai clan was Mullah Omar.

    Two-thirds of all Pashtuns belong to the Durrani-Ghilzai confederacy. The Taliban, though led by a Ghilzai, have drawn in a large number of Durrani fighters. In addition, they enjoy the backing of the Haqqani network, led by Jalaluddin Haqqani, operating out of the tribal belt of Pakistan in North Waziristan. The Haqqani network also exercises predominant control over the bordering Afghan provinces Khost – Paktia and Paktika. Pakistan’s strategy is to pretend that it supports an “Afghan-led” process of national reconciliation while ensuring that the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network, which has strong ties with Al- Qaeda and international Islamist causes, negotiate from a position of strength, so that Southern Afghanistan initially, and thereafter the entire Pashtun belt, come under the control of its “strategic assets”.

    This would be a prelude to the Taliban obtaining a dominant role across the entire country. It is primarily in pursuit of this objective that the senior-most Taliban leader from the Durrani tribe,Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, has been incarcerated and kept incommunicado in Pakistan. Mullah Baradar, like Karzai, hails from the Popalzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns and was known to be close to and in touch with President Karzai. While championing the cause of Pashtuns, Pakistan will not permit any Pashtun leader to undermine its larger ambitions. Pakistan has its own Achilles’ heel. Firstly, no Pashtun worth his salt recognizes the Durand Line.

    Moreover, after the Pakistan army’s assault on the Lal Masjid in 2007, the Tehriq-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has made common cause with other jihadi outfits in Pakistan to challenge the writ of the Pakistan army and the Pakistan state. Unable to directly take on the TTP, the Pakistan army is fomenting tribal animosities between the Mehsud and Waziri tribes in South Waziristan. It is also clear that should a government led by either Imran Khan’s Tehriq-e-Insaf or Nawaz Sharif’s PML (N) assume office after the 2013 elections in Pakistan, one can write off any prospect of the Pakistan army taking action whatsoever against the Haqqani network or other Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, as the American drawdown in Afghanistan proceeds.

    Chinese officials were among the only non-Muslims to meet Mullah Omar in Kandahar in the 1990s, promising him diplomatic recognition and telecom projects. China has maintained contacts with the Quetta Shura in the aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom. These contacts, with Pakistani facilitation, have reportedly been increasing. Thus, while the Chinese may have misgivings and concerns about a possible return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, they appear to believe that their interests in Afghanistan would be protected by Pakistan. In these circumstances, there are now concerns that if not properly equipped, motivated and backed, the Afghan National Army (ANA) could well lose control of the entire Pashtun belt in the country.

    This could have serious consequences for the very unity of Afghanistan. It is significant that influential Afghan leaders like Mohammed Atta and Ismail Khan are preparing the ground to be able to defend areas they control, in the event of the ANA being unable to effectively deal with the Taliban challenge. There should also be no doubt that the primary objective of the Taliban would be to seize control of Kandahar because of its importance in Pashtun minds as the traditional and spiritual capital of the country. There would also be efforts by the Taliban to block the line of communications from Khyber to Jalalabad. India would have to work closely with foreign partners, including the US, its NATO allies, Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia to ensure that the international community remains on course to back the elected government in Afghanistan, economically and militarily.

    While India has already provided Afghanistan with substantial economic assistance and is preparing the ground for large-scale investments in areas like iron ore, coal, steel, copper and gold, the military cooperation envisaged in its strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan remains relatively modest. Indian military analysts, with expertise on Afghanistan’s armed forces, note that in order to ensure that the ANA can stand up to challenges from across the Durand Line, India should readily supply 105 mm Mountain Artillery, armored personnel carriers, Vijayanta Tanks, apart from transportation, demining and communications equipment.

    It remains to be seen whether an establishment wedded to its “Aman Ki Asha” illusions will act decisively on major security challenges emerging in our neighborhood. Equally importantly, India and its partner-states need to recognize that given Pashtun sentiments and historic realities, we should agree that the Durand Line is a “disputed boundary” between Pakistan and Afghanistan, while expressing the hope that the dispute will be resolved peacefully, keeping in view the Pashtun sentiments.

  • Hamid Karzai to meet Obama in Washington, Leon Panetta says

    Hamid Karzai to meet Obama in Washington, Leon Panetta says

    KABUL (TIP): Defense secretary Leon Panetta says Afghan President Hamid Karzai has accepted an invitation from President Barack Obama to meet in Washington. Panetta said at a joint news conference with Karzai that the meeting is to be held during the week of January 7. The two leaders will use the meeting to discuss Afghanistan’s future. Karzai said he and Obama will discuss the number of US troops that will remain in Afghanistan after the combat mission ends there in December 2014.

    Panetta also said that a suicide car bomber who staged an attack at the Kandahar Air Base killed one American serviceman and wounded three others. Two Afghan civilians were also killed in the attack Thursday. Taliban spokesman Qari Jusuf Ahmedi claimed responsibility for the attack in an email, saying a suicide car bomber had targeted foreign military vehicles that were stopped near the gate of Kandahar Airfield. It was unclear if the attack had anything to do with Panetta’s unannounced visit to Kandahar Airfield. Kandahar is a huge and sprawling facility that houses more than 20,000 service members from 20 countries and has more than 11,000 civilian contract workers.

  • US Counsel Who Advised Immunity For ISI Backed Drone Strikes

    US Counsel Who Advised Immunity For ISI Backed Drone Strikes

    WASHINGTON (TIP): The US government legal counsel who advised the Department of Justice to seek immunity for the Pakistani spy agency ISI and two of its former chiefs in the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack turns out to be a strong supporter of the legality of Obama administration’s drone attacks in Pakistan and other countries. Documents reviewed by the Times of India reveal that the immunity guidance to the Justice Department came from Harold Hongju Koh, who is the State Department’s legal advisor, and also a former Dean of the Yale Law School. Koh, who is Korean-American, went on leave from Yale (which is Hillary Clinton’s law school alma mater) after he was appointed to the position in June 2009 by President Obama, who is an alumnus of the Harvard Law School.

    Koh is scheduled to return in January 2003 to Yale, which was started in 1718 with an endowment from Elihu Yale, an American governor of the British East India Company in what was then Madras. In remarks predating his advice on immunity to ISI, Koh asserted that US Drone warfare is lawful self-defense under international law for targeted killings of non-state actors. In a 2010 keynote at the American Society of International Law meeting in Washington DC, Koh stated that “US. targeting practices, including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war.”

    He further explained that the US is in “an armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the associated forces” and thus has the lawful right to use force “consistent with its inherent right to self-defense” under international law in response to the 9/11 attacks. An international law blog which reviewed Koh address said he identified three elements related to situational considerations that the US uses when determining whether a specific targeted drone killing at a particular location will occur: Imminence of the threat; Sovereignty of other States involved; and Willingness and ability of those States to suppress the threat the target poses. Going by the Obama administration’s relentless drone strikes inside Pakistan, Washington seems to make light of the sovereignty issues, believing Islamabad does not have control over its territories ceded to terrorists and is unwilling or unable to take action.

    But in the 26/11 Mumbai case, sovereignty leaps to the forefront, with the US administration challenging the argument that the ISI and its heads are beyond the control or outside the purview of the Pakistani government. “Plaintiffs’ theory is particularly unusual in the context of an intelligence agency, which, like a foreign ministry or defense ministry, serves a quintessentially sovereign purpose,” reads the statement of interest filed by the US Justice Department before the Eastern District Court of New York, where American families of the 26/11 victims have filed their case. Referring specifically to the plaintiff’s implicating the ISI chiefs, the statement concludes that the “Department of State has determined that former Directors General Pasha and Taj are immune because plaintiffs’ allegations relate to acts that these defendants allegedly took in their official capacities as directors of an entity that is undeniably a fundamental part of the Government of Pakistan.”

    Meanwhile, even as New Delhi expressed its disappointment at the Obama administration letting ISI off the hook, US officials maintained that Washington’s submission was based on a technicality in this specific case where it was asked to determine sovereignty issue, and that it “should not be viewed as a US Government determination on the merits of the Plaintiffs’ claims.” In other words, the US is not talking about the involvement or otherwise of ISI and its chiefs in the Mumbai attacks; just on the issue of sovereign immunity as afforded under law and diplomatic conventions.

    In remarks that offered no relief to Pakistan, which was exulting in what it saw as an exculpatory US statement of interest, a state department spokesperson echoed the court submission which urged the Government of Pakistan to dismantle Lashkar-e-Taiba and specifically asked Pakistan “to support India’s efforts to counter this terrorist threat.” Indian officials see the developments as part of a backroom deal between US and Pakistan to facilitate the American drawdown from Afghanistan which will be difficult to accomplish without Pakistan’s help. Pakistan’s own media and civil society, not to speak of highranking US officials, have implicated the country’s military and ISI in sponsorship of terrorism, one official pointed out, suggesting that geo-politics more than technicalities determined the US court submissions.

  • Bomb Kills Seven In Southwest Afghanistan: Officials

    Bomb Kills Seven In Southwest Afghanistan: Officials

    HERAT (TIP): A roadside bomb targeting a police pickup truck killed two policemen and five civilians in southwestern Afghanistan Thursday, provincial authorities said. The vehicle was blown up in the city of Zaranj, the capital of Nimroz province, said acting provincial police chief Mohammad Rahim Chakhansori.

    Provincial governor Sarwar Sobat confirmed the death toll to AFP, saying a policewoman was wounded in the attack. Afghan forces are often the victims of attacks by Taliban insurgents as they increasingly take control of security before the withdrawal of NATO troops from the country by 2014. Roadside bombs are the weapon of choice for the hardline Islamists.

  • Landmine Blast Kills 10 Girls In Afghanistan

    Landmine Blast Kills 10 Girls In Afghanistan

    KABUL (TIP): A car bomb exploded outside of a compound housing a US military contractor in Kabul the Afghan capital on Monday, blowing apart an exterior wall, killing at least two Afghan workers and wounding 15 other people, company representatives and police said. In another part of the country, a suspected landmine killed 10 young girls in the east of the country, police said. The girls who died ranged in age from 9 to 13. Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack in Kabul.

  • World Kabaddi Cup a Step in the Right Direction

    World Kabaddi Cup a Step in the Right Direction

    The ancient game of Kabaddi is enshrined permanently in the mind of every son of the soil Punjabi. In olden times, it used to be played on the dusty grounds of village common land. There used to be no hard and fast rules of the game. Sometimes the raiders indulged in tactical cheating during chanting of words “Kabaddi Kabaddi” or “Kaudi Kaudi”. In Punjabi style one raider was the attacker and one defender used to stop him. A deliberate touch by a raider targeting two attackers resulted in the point going to the defenders. In a reverse situation, if two stoppers tried to stop the raider one after the other or simultaneously, the point went to the raider.

    Throwing the opponent, raider or defender, out of the ground resulted in a point. This has always been the game of strength, stamina, lung power and agility on the part of the raiders and the defenders. Prior to the independence of India, this game was quite popular in all the five administrative divisions of the Province of Punjab. It was more popular in Lahore and Jalandhar divisions and least popular in Ambala division.

    But now it is popular all over the Indian Punjab and is played equally passionately across the Radcliffe Line in Pakistan’s Punjab. Needing just a pair of shorts and not even requiring formal shoes, this used to be and still is a very inexpensive game. But in order to stay physically fit, the player has to be given strength and stamina building diet and exercise. In olden times a lot of stress was laid on eating butter.

    This culture still prevails, but now some of the athletes are eating a lot more diverse diet. During the nineteen fifties, a lot of Sikh youths settled in the United Kingdom. At about the same time and a decade and two later, Sikh Diaspora spread to Canada also. These expatriate Sikhs passionately love Kabaddi. When they visit their ancestral homes in India, they want to see Kabaddi being played in their respective villages. In order to see that they spend quite a considerable amount of money to arrange Kabaddi tournaments in their mostly non-descript villages. These impromptu tournaments have become very popular in the rural areas of the Punjab.

    In the last two decades there were hundreds of such tournaments held in villages all across Punjab during the six month window from October to April. As the game is flourishing, rules are also getting defined and enforced meticulously. Now the raider has to return to the dividing line in half a minute. Crossing to one’s own side after touching a defender at any spot, other than the designated return line, results in a point being awarded to the defender.

    Slapping the opponent, raider or the defender, results in point being awarded to the opponent. Sensing the enormous popularity of Kabaddi, the Punjab Government in India decided to embrace it. Deputy Chief Minister Sukhbir Singh Badal started the first edition of World Kabaddi Cup in 2010 in a grand style. The matches were held over several venues all over the Punjab. Kabaddi is now played regularly in Pakistan, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States. India won the inaugural cup and a handsome amount of money.

    The tournament was telecast by PTC TV channel all over India and in several countries, where PTC’s footprint exists. Last year (2011) saw more teams participating. Nice arrangements were made for board and lodging of the teams. Italy was a surprise entry into the semifinal. Several players from the United States and the Canadian teams were disqualified after being found positive in dope tests. In addition to men, several women’s teams were also invited to participate. This created gender equality in this hitherto rural sport. India had a decisive edge in women’s group. In the year 2012, the “Third World Cup Kabaddi Tournament” was held from the first to the 15th of December. The matches were spread in several locations all over the state.

    A glittering several hours long opening ceremony was held in Bathinda on December 1st. The other venues included the holy and premier tourist city of Amritsar, Gurdaspur, Chohla Sahib (Tarntaran), Jalandhar, Hoshiarpur, Fazilka, Faridkot, Mansa, Sangrur, Ropar, Bathinda and Ludhiana. In the men’s category in addition to the host nation India, Argentina, the USA, Canada, England, Scotland, Norwey, Italy, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, New Zealand and Srilanka accepted the invitation to participate.

    In the women’s section, USA, Canada, England, Denmark, Malaysia, Turkmenistan and India participated. Nepal eventually failed to show up for the matches. The winning team in men’s section in 2012 was offered two crore of rupees and the runners-up team was offered a prize of one crore of rupees. The team finishing at number three was offered half a crore of rupees. These are indeed huge prizes unseen in the history of the game. There have been some problems in the organizational structure of the tournament.

    The buildings of the stadiums are quite good, but the playing fields left much to be desired. Barring a couple of stadiums in Amritsar and Ludhiana, rest of the playing fields were devoid of a decent grass cover and the soil was very hard. Kabaddi players in the European and American countries are used to play on lush green grass turfs. When they are made to play on hard dry soil, their performance level suffers. That is one reason as to why the Canadian and the American teams could not perform to their capacity.

    The teams that entered the semifinal included three teams from Asia. These are Iran, Pakistan and India. The fourth qualifier was the Canadian team. The team from the USA was narrowly beaten by Iran. Both India and Pakistan toyed with their semifinalist rivals. Indian crushed Iran and Pakistan mauled team Canada. In the women’s group also the competition in 2012 was of a much higher level. The Canadian and the Malaysian teams consisted of mostly players of Indian descent. The out of practice Canadian girls played poorly, but the hard working Malaysians covered themselves with glory and entered the final. Two European teams, the English and the Denmark teams also were impressive. Turkmenistan team was very good too. But the Indian players were outstanding.

    This successfully conducted tournament is likely to boost the economy of Punjab. A lot of tourists have been visiting the state to watch this tournament. Some of the participating teams are staying behind in Punjab to play in several village level tournaments to be held in the months of December and January. The two African teams Kenya and Sierra Leone are also staying behind to get more match practice and to master the finer points of the game.

    Both finals and the grand closing ceremony were held in the multipurpose Guru Nanak Stadium in Ludhiana on the night of Saturday December 15th. In the men’s final India crushed arch rivals Pakistan by 59 points to 22. Canada crushed Iran on December 13th in Jalandhar to win the third place and a prize of one hundred thousand dollars. In the final of women’s category on December 15th, in a one sided encounter India toyed with Malaysia.

    The third place in women’s group was won by Denmark by defeating England on December 13th. This was a very closely contested match. The young school and college going girls from Denmark impressed everyone. The dazzling closing ceremony was dominated by the film industry of Bollywood. Katrina Kaif was the star of the night. Film and pop singers Diljit Singh and Sukhvinder Singh kept the jam-packed stadium entertained. Punjab’s most popular TV anchor Satinder Satti was the master of ceremony. In the end there was an impressive show of fireworks. At the end the flame was extinguished, with a promise to hold another edition in 2013. Katrina Kaif and troupe entertain at one of the venues

  • Islamist Terrorism may end by 2030

    Islamist Terrorism may end by 2030

    WASHINGTON (TIP): A landmark US intelligence report released on Dec 10 says the “current Islamist phase of terrorism” might end by 2030, but violent terrorism itself is unlikely to die completely and might evolve into bloodless forms of economic and financial terrorism.

    Many states might continue to use terrorist group out of a strong sense of insecurity, although the costs to a regime of directly supporting terrorists looks set to become even greater as international cooperation increase, according to the report Global Trends 2030. But with more widespread access to lethal and disruptive technologies, individuals who are experts in such niche areas as cyber systems might sell their services to the highest bidder, including terrorists who would focus less on causing mass casualties and more on creating widespread economic and financial disruptions, it warned.

    The report has a dismal prognosis for Pakistan, widely considered the epicenter of terrorism, ranking the country 12th among 15 countries that have a high risk of failure in a list that is topped by Somalia and includes Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Ethiopia. Bangladesh, which was ranked 11th in the last such report issued in 2008, is now considered stable and has been moved out of the list.

    Although the report said South Asia would continue to face internal and external shocks during the next 15- 20 years, including tensions between India and Pakistan over resources, it saw New Delhi’s “power advantage” relative to Islamabad growing rapidly.

    India’s economy is already nearly eight times as large as Pakistan’s; by 2030 that ratio could easily be more than 16-to-1, it said. In fact, to the likely dismay of Indian planners who factor in Pakistan’s economic growth and stability for peace-making prospects, the country does not even find mention as a second level economy such as Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, South Africa, Mexico, Turkey, that the report countsin a list of middle tier that will also rise by 2030.

    “Low growth, rising food prices, and energy shortages will pose stiff challenges to governance in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s youth bulges are large — similar in size to those found in many African countries. When these youth bulges are combined with a slow-growing economy, they portend increased instability,” the report warns. India, the report says, is in a better position, benefiting from higher growth, but it will still be challenged to find jobs for its large youth population. Inequality, lack of infrastructure, and education deficiencies are key weaknesses in India.

    “The neighborhood has always had a profound influence on internal developments, increasing the sense of insecurity and bolstering military outlays. Conflict could erupt and spread under numerous scenarios,” the report warns, adding that conflicting strategic goals, widespread distrust, and hedging strategies by all the parties will make it difficult for them to develop a strong regional security framework.

  • US, Nato Behind ‘Insecurity’ in Afghanistan: Karzai

    US, Nato Behind ‘Insecurity’ in Afghanistan: Karzai

    Afghan President Hamid Karzai sharply criticized the United States in an exclusive interview with NBC News on Thursday, December 4 blaming American and NATO forces for some of the growing insecurity in his country. “Part of the insecurity is coming to us from the structures that NATO and America created in Afghanistan,” Karzai said during a one-on-one interview at the presidential palace.

    However, he also acknowledged that much of the country’s violence was caused by insurgent groups. The Taliban are regaining land and power lost after they were toppled by U.S.-backed forces in 2001. Meanwhile, Karzai has gone from being a favorite of Washington under the presidency of George W. Bush, to a thorn in the White House’s side with his criticism of American night raids and mounting civilian casualties at the hands of NATO troops.

    Many in Washington have also grown weary of Karzai, viewing him as ineffective and presiding over a deeply corrupt government.

    Karzai, who is serving his second five-year term, also told NBC News that he had sent a letter to President Barack Obama saying that Afghanistan would not sign any new security agreements with the United States until hundreds of prisoners held in U.S. custody were transferred to Afghan authorities.

    More than ten years after the beginning of the war, Afghanistan faces external pressure to reform as well as ongoing internal conflicts. His criticism of the United States, Afghanistan’s most important ally, has come after the start of complex bilateral talks on a security pact on the role the United States would play after most of its troops are withdrawn by the end of 2014.

    Karzai said the inmates in American detention in Afghanistan were being held in breach of an agreement he and Obama signed in March and must be handed over immediately. A vehicle filled with explosives detonated near one of the gates of the Jalalabad airfield in eastern Afghanistan on Sunday morning. “We signed the strategic partnership agreement with the expectation and the hope … the nature of the United States’ activities in Afghanistan will change,” Karzai said.

    But American behavior had not changed, he said, adding that terrorism would not be defeated “by attacking Afghan villages and Afghan homes.” The dispute between the two countries centers around Bagram Air Base and a nearby detention facility, which have long been seen as a symbol of American impunity and disrespect by many Afghans. “I have written to President Obama that the Afghan people will not allow its government to enter into a security agreement, while the United States continues to violate Afghan sovereignty and Afghan loss,” he said.

    In southern Afghanistan, the focus of the U.S. war effort, nearly all the Afghan soldiers are foreigners too. Photographer Kevin Frayer shows these soldiers in a series of portraits. During the interview, Karzai also said that he didn’t think al-Qaida “has a presence in Afghanistan.” He added: “I don’t even know if al-Qaida exists as an organization as it is being spoken about. So all we know is that we have insecurity.” In the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, the United States led the invasion to topple the Taliban, which was harboring al-Qaida and its then-leader, Osama bin Laden.

    While weakened, especially after the death of bin Laden at the hands of U.S. special forces in Pakistan in 2011, al-Qaida is still thought to have strong links with the Taliban and other Afghan insurgents. Karzai said Afghans were thankful to foreign forces for being “liberated” in 2001, but complained that since then his countrymen had suffered the most in the fight against extremism. “In the name of the war on terror the Afghan people have paid the greatest price of any. That has not been recognized,” he said.

    While there have been more than 2,000 American military casualties since the invasion of Afghanistan, civilians have borne the brunt of the violence. In the first six months of 2012 alone, more than 3,000 civilians were killed or injured, according the United Nations.

    This number was down 15 percent from a year earlier. Anti-government and coalition insurgents were responsible for 80 percent of the civilian casualties, the U.N. says.

    A suicide bomber, disguised as an Afghan police officer, blew himself up outside a mosque in northern Afghanistan, killing 40 people and wounding more than 50. NBC’s Tazeen Ahmad reports from Kabul.

    Karzai also addressed the issue of graft during the interview, saying there was “no doubt that there is corruption in Afghanistan.” “The bigger corruption is the corruption in contracts,” he added.

    “The contracts are not issued by the Afghan government. The contracts are issued by the international community, mainly by the United States.” In 2010, the country received $6.4 billion in official development assistance, representing more than 40 percent of its gross domestic product, according to humanitarian news site AlertNet. Two-thirds of the funds aren’t channeled through the government because of concerns about corruption and the government’s ability to use the money properly, AlertNet added.

    Afghanistan is tied with Somalia and North Korea at the bottom of Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 2012. A 2012 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report estimated that Afghans paid $2.5 billion in bribes over 12 months, which is equivalent to almost a quarter of the country’s GDP. The international community had fostered graft to keep the Afghan state weak, Karzai said.

    “I’ve come to believe (that) … corruption comes from the United States through contracts and through the corruption in both systems,” he said, adding that the “perception of corruption is deliberate to render the Afghan government exploitable, to weaken it,” he said. “This is something that I have began to believe in firmly now after the experiences that I’ve gained in … working on this issue.”

  • Hamid Karzai To Meet Obama In Washington, Leon Panetta Says

    Hamid Karzai To Meet Obama In Washington, Leon Panetta Says

    KABUL (TIP): Defense secretary Leon Panetta says Afghan President Hamid Karzai has accepted an invitation from President Barack Obama to meet in Washington. Panetta said at a joint news conference with Karzai that the meeting is to be held during the week of January 7. The two leaders will use the meeting to discuss Afghanistan’s future. Karzai said he and Obama will discuss the number of US troops that will remain in Afghanistan after the combat mission ends there in December 2014.

    Panetta also said that a suicide car bomber who staged an attack at the Kandahar Air Base killed one American serviceman and wounded three others. Two Afghan civilians were also killed in the attack Thursday. Taliban spokesman Qari Jusuf Ahmedi claimed responsibility for the attack in an email, saying a suicide car bomber had targeted foreign military vehicles that were stopped near the gate of Kandahar Airfield. It was unclear if the attack had anything to do with Panetta’s unannounced visit to Kandahar Airfield. Kandahar is a huge and sprawling facility that houses more than 20,000 service members from 20 countries and has more than 11,000 civilian contract workers.

  • Taliban Leaders Send Their Girl Children To School : UN

    Taliban Leaders Send Their Girl Children To School : UN

    NEW DELHI (TIP): A top UN official today claimed that some Taliban leaders, who issued fatwa against girls’ education during their rule in Afghanistan, have themselves sent their female children to schools run with the support of the international body. Louis-Georges Arsenault, who was Unicef representative in Afghanistan from 1998 to 2001, also claimed that Taliban issued fatwa against girls’ education during their regime (1996 to 2001) as the group feared that “movement” of women and girls on the streets would “distract the focus” of their fighters from their “task ahead”.

    Arsenault, who took over as Unicef India representative a couple of months ago, made these remarks this while addressing the National Consultation on Education in Areas Affected by Civil Strife here. During their rule, Taliban issued Fatwa against girls’ education and declared that there will be no girl education in the country, Arsenault said. He said top Taliban officials had “openly” told UN officials who were talking to them at that point of time that the fatwa was issued because they needed their troops to focus the task ahead and not be distracted by the movement of women and girls. Despite the diktat, there were NGOs, community leaders and teachers who were in hiding providing some kind of education to the children in some parts of the country.

    The Unicef went about quietly without attracting media attention in working on school education in collaboration with these segments of population and taking expertise from Government officials and academicians. “Some of the Taliban fighters were sending their girls in schools any way,” said Arsenault, who is credited with managing one of Unicef’s largest humanitarian operations, including the coordination of relief and rehabilitation services to over 250,000 women, children and men displaced by Afghan conflict. According to the Unicef, Arsenault, despite Taliban’s edicts against girls’ education, initiated several projects to arrange private schooling for them.

  • Leon Panetta In Afghanistan To Meet With Hamid Karzai

    Leon Panetta In Afghanistan To Meet With Hamid Karzai

    KABUL (TIP): US defense secretary Leon Panetta, who has flown to Afghanistan for talks with President Hamid Karzai, says President Barack Obama will decide in the next few weeks how many US troops will after the combat mission ends there. Panetta arrived on Wednesday on an unannounced visit to Kabul to consult with top military commanders as well as confer with Karzai. The visit comes at a difficult juncture in the Western coalition’s efforts to shift more security responsibilities to Afghan forces so the combat mission can end in December 2014. While security has generally improved lately, the Afghan government’s ability to effectively govern and to root out corruption is in great doubt.

    Peace talks with the Taliban are on a back burner. Speaking to reporters earlier Wednesday in Kuwait, Panetta did not reveal what options Obama is considering, but officials have said he may settle on a figure between 6,000 and 10,000 troops. There currently are about 66,000 US troops in Afghanistan. The post-2014 mission is expected to focus on counterterrorism and advising Afghan security forces. Before flying to Afghanistan, Panetta spoke to about 100 US service members inside an aircraft hangar at a desert base west of Kuwait City. He thanked them for their service and emphasized that the US is winding down its involvement in lengthy wars.

  • Afghan Attacks Down Overall, Insider Threat Rises : Pentagon Report

    Afghan Attacks Down Overall, Insider Threat Rises : Pentagon Report

    WASHINGTON (TIP): The US and its allies have made only spotty and incremental progress in the Afghan war, with overall violence declining just slightly in the past year and widespread corruption continuing to hamper the shaky government, according to a new Pentagon report. It also noted that the ongoing insider attacks, in which Afghan forces or people dressed in Afghan uniforms turn their weapons on coalition troops, “have the potential to significantly disrupt the Coalition mission in Afghanistan.” The report comes as the US Army is updating its handbook for soldiers on how to detect and prevent such attacks.

    A draft of the 70-page handbook includes a pullout tip card that details indicators of a possible insider attack, such as reclusive behavior, desire for control, increased focus on violence and abrupt behavioral changes. It also reminds soldiers to be aware of cultural differences, including the need to avoid doing things in front of Afghans that are considered offensive. Troops, the handbook says, should not blow their noses, put their feet up on desks, wink, spit, point fingers at Afghans or use the “ok” hand signal, which some Afghans interpret as an obscene gesture, The handbook, titled “Insider Threats-Afghanistan, Observations, insights and Lessons Learned,” also details the more than 320 casualties caused by insider attacks between May 2007 and Oct. 1, 2012.

    A recent review of the data by The Associated Press revealed that the Haqqani insurgent network, based in Pakistan and with ties to al-Qaida, is suspected of being a driving force behind a significant number of the insider attacks. Military leaders have worked to reduce the insider threat, noting that it is driving a wedge between coalition and Afghan troops, rattling the trust between them and raising questions about how effectively the allied forces can train the Afghans to take over security of their own country in 2014 and beyond. The senior US official acknowledged Monday that the US continues to be very concerned about the attacks, even though there have been fewer in recent months. The coalition forces are trying to identify high-risk groups and Afghans, and the handbook is aimed at helping them do that.

  • Pakistan Extends Refugee Status for Afghans

    Pakistan Extends Refugee Status for Afghans

    ISLAMABAD (TIP): Pakistan has extended refugee status for over a million Afghans in the country by an additional six months, the government announced, a move likely to ease fears of Afghans living in Pakistan that they would soon have to return home. Pakistan has been hosting hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees dating back to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan three decades ago. But many Pakistanis have become increasingly frustrated with the length of time the Afghans have stayed and would like them to leave.

    The Pakistani government said in a statement released late Wednesday that refugee status had been set to expire on Dec. 30 and that they would extend it for another six months. The statement said there are 1.6 million registered and 1 million unregistered Afghans in Pakistan. The extension would not affect unregistered Afghans, who are considered illegal residents. The Afghan population in Pakistan is a legacy of Afghanistan’s repeated conflicts, starting with the Soviet Union’s invasion in 1979.

    Many refugees can’t fathom returning to Afghanistan any time soon, saying their homeland is still too violent and desperately poor. Ehsanullah Elaj, an Afghan refugee who is a dentist in the city of Rawalpindi next to Islamabad, questioned what would happen to the refugees after the six-month extension expires. “It would be very difficult for us to return to Afghanistan,” Elaj said. “The majority of people want to stay here.”

  • Inder Kumar Gujral A Gentle Statesman Prime Minister

    Inder Kumar Gujral A Gentle Statesman Prime Minister

    Born on the 4th of December in 1919, in the district headquarter town of Jhelum in the then Rawalpindi division of pre-1947 united Punjab, former Prime Minister of India Shri Inder Kumar Gujral died just four days short of turning ninety three on October 30, 2012.

    Throughout his long eventful life, he remained a very decent and gentle human being. He never ruffled any feathers. His father Avtar Narain Gujral, a freedom fighter, and mother Pushpa Gujral were both very suave and soft spoken individuals and social workers. Academically Inder Kumar Gujral was a very bright student. He completed his education up to 10th standard from his native place Jhelum. For his college education he moved to Punjab’s capital of Lahore, from where he graduated in arts.

    While studying in Lahore, he inculcated love and affinity for Urdu/Persian as a language and developed special interest in Urdu poetry and became an ardent listener of “Ghazals. He especially liked the voices of Kundan Lal Saigal, Mallika Pukhraj, Mehdi Hassan and Begum Akhtar.While studying in Lahore, he came in contact with some freedom fighters and some left leaning student activists. He was always considerate towards the poor and the under privileged and this tendency brought him into the fold of the Communist Party of India for some time.

    In 1947, India attained its hard fought independence from the British Raj, which resulted in painful partition of the province of Punjab. Ugly riots of unseen dimensions erupted thereafter and a lot of humanity was massacred for no reason or rhyme. Inder Kumar Gujral’s parents entered India through the bloody Lahore – Amritsar corridor and finally settled in Jalandhar, but Inder Kumar Gujral himself, along with his wife traveled all the way to Karachi, from where they sailed to Bombay. From Bombay they came by train to New Delhi, where they virtually starved at the railway station for three days and nights.

    Eventually Inder Kumar Gujral settled in New Delhi, but maintained a strong bond with his parental place of residence in Jalandhar. Mrs. Indira Gandhi liked Mr. Gujral’s uncommon humility and intellectual brilliance. She made him the union minister for information and broadcasting during early nineteen seventies. As a minister Mr. Gujral strengthened the Urdu Service of All India Radio with high powered medium-wave transmitters located at Rajkot and Jalandhar. He streamlined all the language services to the neighboring countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Tibet, China, Afghanistan, the Middle-East and Iran.

    He was also instrumental in taking first steps towards expansion of government owned television services in several important areas away from New Delhi. Under his able stewardship, government television was successfully introduced in Bombay, Amritsar and Srinagar and several other projects all over India were planned, which included the establishment of a modern television studio complex for the state of Punjab in Jalandhar. After the promulgation of national internal emergency in 1975, Mrs. Indira Gandhi took away the portfolio of information and broadcasting from I.K. Gujral.

    She sent him to Moscow as India’s Ambassador to the Soviet Union. This was a very important assignment. His stay in Moscow was instrumental in furtherance of Indo-Soviet cooperation. When Mrs. Indira Gandhi lost power in the general elections of 1977, her successor Morarji Desai did not replace him and kept him in his Moscow assignment throughout his own two year long tenure. After P.V. Narsimha Rao’s scandal ridden five year tenure was over in 1996, the Congress was badly defeated.

    Even the main opposition the Bharatiya Janata Party could not win enough seats to form a government on its own. At that time a coalition government under the banner of united front government headed by Deve Gowda of Karnataka was formed in New Delhi. It was supported by the Congress from outside. Mr. Gujral served as the Union Minister of External Affairs of India.

    Within ten months the patience of Congress ran out and Dewe Gouda was shown the door. He was replaced by his most gentle foreign minister, a suave and humble parliamentarian Inder Kumar Gujral. During his scandal free but not too long prime ministerial tenure in 1997, Mr. Gujral improved India’s relations with all the neighboring countries including Pakistan, China and Bangladesh.

    Unfortunately his term was also abruptly cut short. As the Prime Minister I.K. Gujral did a lot for Punjab. He wrote off entire loan obtained by the Government of Punjab to fight militancy during the eighties and nineties. He strengthened the broadcasting services in Punjab by strengthening the existing medium-wave transmitters with high powered ones. He wanted to establish an international airport in Punjab, which could serve the needs of the Punjabi diaspora spread all over the world.

    His desire was to establish this airport on the Jalandhar – Kapurthala Highway. But land was too expensive in that area. Eventually he agreed to let the existing Rajah Sansi Airport on the outskirts of Amritsar to be upgraded to an international airport. For Jalandhar, however he did a lot. As prime minister he took personal interest to sanction money for a lot of road over rail bridges.

    In Kapurthala, he sanctioned the establishment of an ultra-modern high tech science city, which is now the biggest tourist attraction of Kapurthala and the Bist Doab region.

    For the past few months in 2012, he was not keeping good health. When he breathed his last on Friday November 30, the entire nation was plunged into mourning for a departed gentle statesman. A seven day mourning has been ordered by the Government of India.

    During this periods, the national flag of India will fly all over the world at half mast.We salute Inder Kumar Gujral for what he was and what he stood for.

  • Restrictions on Tourist visa re-entry within two months lifted

    Restrictions on Tourist visa re-entry within two months lifted

    NEW YORK (TIP): The government of India has reviewed the provision relating to two months gap between two visits of a foreign national to India on a tourist visa. A Press Release from Indian Consulate in New York says the restriction has now been lifted except for nationals of China, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, Sudan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, foreigners of Pakistan and Bangladesh origin and stateless persons.

  • India: the warped history and geography of Non Alignment 2.0

    India: the warped history and geography of Non Alignment 2.0

    In the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Narasimha Rao government reworked India’s dysfunctional economic and foreign policies to improve India’s abysmal terms of trade with the rest of the world. The latest global financial crisis seems to have shaken the United States’ global dominance and is forcing India to revisit its post-Soviet foreign policy.

    Choices Asian countries like India make in the near future will affect the chances of the emergence of an ‘Asian Concert’ that, in turn, will influence the United States’ ability to sustain its dominance by ‘rebalancing’ toward Asia. A second term for President Obama means that Asian countries may be compelled to respond to ‘rebalancing’ sooner rather than later. Obama’s first foreign tour since his re-election is a case in point. But as usual India is struggling to discover the right balance between strategic independence and alignment, and soft and hard powers. NonAlignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century, a document released in February 2012, is of interest in this context, as it is one of the most comprehensive contributions to the ongoing debate within India.

    It discusses India’s strategic opportunities and attempts to outline India’s foreign and strategic policy over the next decade. While the authors, including well-known academics, retired government officials, journalists and industry representatives, ‘were administratively supported by the National Defence College and Centre for Policy Research’, the usual disclaimers apply. Written over a year, the document’s release coincided with the Chinese foreign minister’s visit to India and was attended by the current and past National Security Advisors, who mostly disagreed with the document. The document indeed does not throw much light on India’s foreign policy conundrum – ‘to enhance India’s strategic space and capacity for independent agency’. It largely restricts itself to presenting a bulleted list of what ought to be done. The authors were ‘driven by a sense of urgency… that we have a limited window of opportunity in which to seize our chances’ and the belief that ‘internal development will depend decisively on how effectively we manage our global opportunities’.

    But they seem to be torn between nostalgia for India’s earlier non-alignment policy and the belief in India as a quintessentially nonaggressive country, and the reality of an emerging multipolar world, where hard choices are unavoidable and hard power counts. NonAlignment 2.0 then appears to be a convenient, if not ad hoc, solution to India’s foreign policy conundrum in the midst of the growing chances of confrontation between the US and China, as well as between Israel and Iran. Three aspects of this document – which limit its usefulness – are striking. First, the document is devoid of idealism, which, irrespective of its impracticality, could have helped build overarching structures to reconcile the otherwise irreconcilable claims upon foreign policy. Second, the discussion is not built upon any theoretical and strategic framework, given the ad hoc nature of the solutions presented in the document. Third, the document does not empirically substantiate the assumptions that inform the solutions.

    The discussion essentially happens in a vacuum without engaging in parallel or preceding debates. The document does not even refer to the Non-Alignment Movement. Unsurprisingly, the authors neither explain why and in what ways the earlier non-alignment policy needs to be changed, nor do they explain in what respects NonAlignment 2.0 is different. Moreover, the authors think in largely non-institutional terms, which is surprising given their commitment to nonalignment that ideally entails multilateralism. This is evident from the absence of references to key organizations and blocs such as ASEAN, the EU and SAARC. With the exception of the IMF, UN and the G20, other international organizations are rarely, if ever, mentioned. And there is hardly any discussion on potential alternatives to the existing international organizations. A narrow geographical focus compounds the historical and institutional vacuum at the heart of NonAlignment 2.0. Global pretensions notwithstanding, the document largely focuses on China and Pakistan – the only countries that have sub-chapters devoted to them. Most references to the US are related to Pakistan, Afghanistan and China. Even Pakistan is thought of ‘as a subset of the larger strategic challenges posed by China’. SAARC members, excluding Pakistan and Afghanistan, are referred to merely seven times, of which five references are to Bangladesh.

    And Indonesia, another important neighbor, and Japan, an important partner, attract less attention than Iran. In fact, Iran completely overshadows the Middle East in the document. Viewed alongside the lack of engagement with international institutions and India’s history, the skewed geographical focus of NonAlignment 2.0 suggests two things that should disturb those who, for some reasons, hope that India will step up and play a larger role in the emerging international order in Asia. Firstly, a significant section of the Indian strategic community continues to be obsessed with Pakistan and, increasingly, China and, hence, is oriented toward India’s northern land borders. Such an orientation is obsolete given India’s ever increasing marine footprint and growing economic and strategic engagement with countries across the world. Secondly, they also continue to be unable to imagine international institutional solutions to perennial regional military and diplomatic concerns.

    For instance, NonAlignment 2.0 informs us that in future, Chinese attempts to escalate the China-India border conflict ought to be countered through ‘effective insurgency in the areas occupied by Chinese forces’. This is a solution from another age. But as veteran journalist BG Verghese pointed out, this document is important insofar as it challenges others to think aloud.

  • Working With an Emerging ‘New Afghanistan’

    Working With an Emerging ‘New Afghanistan’

    Afghanistan has both benefited and suffered from the decade-old international intervention. A vast and a diverse section of the Afghan population, nearly a generation of Afghans, have benefited in several ways – right from increased participation in national politics to rise in social status to evident economic empowerment – and have come to have stakes in the international engagement.

    Perhaps, one of the key achievements of the initial Bonn Process was the civilianization of the role of factional or militia commanders of various hue and persuasions. In view of the virtual absence of state institutions in 2001, the democratization of Afghan politics, however weak, has been a significant achievement. A new era of political accommodation that began with the overthrow of the Taliban regime, despite constant jostling for political space and dominance among disparate factions within the new set up, has quietly led to the emergence of what may be referred to as the ‘New Afghanistan’.

    The attributes of the old factional politics of the 1990s are very much part of it, nevertheless, it has a broader political vision for the country based on an inclusive representational political order against the strictly narrow, sectarian and backward looking worldview of the Pakistanbacked Afghan militant groups. The challenge post-2014 would thus be one of sustaining and strengthening the democratic political system and the new constitution, considered as critical to the survival of the ‘New Afghanistan’. India, though not considered a major player or a leading force in Afghanistan, is the largest regional contributor to the Afghan reconstruction. However, Indian presence and engagement remains critically dependent on the security situation there.

    The provisions of the India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement are supposedly geared to ensure the continuity in engagement at various levels even in worst of scenarios. India’s support for an Afghan-led peace process aimed at the Taliban, and its readiness to ramp up its training program for the Afghan military, is very much in sync with evolving strategy to help Kabul deal with the likely challenges. The shift in India’s approach to reconstruction assistance, from huge to small development projects, and innovative capacity building programs for thousands of young Afghans at its own institutions, is part of India’s constant effort to adjust and adapt to the changing ground realities.

    However, as the Western engagement draws down and old patterns of Afghan conflict re-emerge, India may be confronted with some very familiar as well as newly emerging challenges. It might be pertinent to ask whether the current level and nature of engagement with Afghanistan would suffice in terms of protecting India’s interests after 2014-15? Perhaps, following set of factors would be critical to re-evaluating India’s approach: Firstly, the kind of political leadership or power structure that emerges in Afghanistan after 2014 and its perception about Indian role and presence; secondly, effectiveness of the US presence and strategy and how West deals with Pakistan; thirdly, what are India’s existing leverages within Afghanistan or at the regional level; fourthly, and most importantly, how far Afghans are willing to go with India’s interests and objectives.

    The current debate within India’s strategic community on possible ways and means of dealing with the likely political instability in Afghanistan post-2014 varies widely. It can be summarized into three broad categories: a more neutral or nonpartisan approach towards the internally factionalized politics, basically keeping out of the proxy politics and working towards an internationally-guaranteed neutral Afghan state; a more balanced approach by way of reaching out to the entire spectrum of political leadership, including the Taliban elements willing to work with the Afghan Government; and finally, a more pro-active approach in terms of providing direct military assistance towards the stabilization of Afghanistan, preferably by way of deploying troops on Afghan soil to work closely with the Afghan military or as part of a UN-led and mandated peace keeping force.

    As for Pakistan and its politics, it is likely to remain a huge geo-political reality for both India and Afghanistan. Afghanistan and the region cannot wait for Pakistan to reverse its decades-old policy of nurturing and using militant religious and terrorist organizations against its immediate neighbors and transform itself into an enlightened modern nation-state. Perhaps, a relatively viable and practical option would be to rather help Afghanistan transform itself into a stable democratic state, capable enough to deal with its challenges with minimal external support, while keeping up the engagement with Pakistan. The long-term objective here should be to build a cooperative relationship between the countries of the region based on increased economic connectivity and its shared advantages in a gradual and phased manner. This is where the significance of working with newly emerging modern Afghanistan lies.

  • FBI adds US ‘rapping jihadi’ to terror wanted list

    FBI adds US ‘rapping jihadi’ to terror wanted list

    WASHINGTON (TIP): The FBI said on Wednesday it had added to its list of most wanted terrorists the American “rapping jihadi,” an operative for Somalia’s al-Qaida linked Shebab insurgents who uses rap as a propaganda tool. Omar Shafik Hammami, who was born in Alabama but is now thought to live in Somalia, is believed to be a senior leader of the Shebab rebels, who were placed on the US State Department’s terror blacklist in 2008.

    The group has “repeatedly threatened terrorist actions against America and American interests,” the Federal Bureau of Investigations said in a statement. Also known as Abu Mansour al- Amriki, Hammami has been releasing rap songs in English on the Internet since 2009 as a recruitment tool, although music is forbidden in al- Qaida’s strict interpretation of Islam. In the songs, Hammami says he hopes to be killed by a drone strike or in a cruise missile attack so he can achieve martyrdom.

    He invites young people to join the jihad to “wipe Israel off the globe,” and he encourages strikes against the US military in Afghanistan and Somalia. Hammami, who has been indicted in the United States on various terrorism charges, has been the subject of an international arrest warrant since 2007.

    Also added to the terror most wanted list on Wednesday was Filipino Raddulan Sahiron, wanted for his alleged role in the kidnapping of an American in the Philippines in 1993 by the al-Qaida-linked Islamist group Abu Sayyaf.

    Sahiron is believed to be the leader of the group, which was put on the US terror blacklist in 1997, the FBI said. The Abu Sayyaf was set up in the 1990s with seed money from Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaida network, according to the Philippine military, and has been blamed for that nation’s worst terrorist attacks.

    These include the bombing of a passenger ferry in Manila Bay that killed over 100 people in 2004, as well as many kidnappings of foreigners and Filipinos in the Muslim-populated south of the country where it is based.

    The State Department’s Rewards for Justice program is offering a reward of up to $1 million for information leading to the arrest of Sahiron, who is believed to be in the Sulu archipelago. Sahiron was indicted in US federal court in 2007 in connection with the kidnapping of an American citizen who was held hostage for 23 days on the island of Jolo.

    The FBI said it is seeking information on a third man, Shaykh Aminullah, who is suspected of providing material support to terrorists with the help of the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e- Taiba, designated a terrorist group in 2001.

    The suspect, who is believed to be living in the Pakistani city of Peshawar, is accused of having provided support in the form of funding and recruits to the al-Qaida network and to the Taliban. The FBI most wanted terrorist list was created in October 2001, shortly after the September 11 attacks. The Seeking Information — Terrorism list was then created to publicize efforts to find suspects not yet charged with crimes.

  • Hedging Bets: Washington’s Pivot to India

    Hedging Bets: Washington’s Pivot to India

    In November 2010, President Obama visited India for three days. In addition to meeting with top Indian business leaders and announcing deals between the two countries worth more than $10 billion, the president declared on several occasions that the US and India’s would be the “defining partnership of the twenty-first century.” Afterward, Obama flew straight to Jakarta without any plans to visit Pakistan, officially the US’s major non-NATO ally in the region.

    No president, except Jimmy Carter, had done such a thing before. The US has traditionally seen its India and Pakistan policies as being deeply linked, and except for Richard Nixon’s brief “tilt” in 1971, the US has been cautious of elevating one neighbor over the other. Despite India’s non-aligned status and pro-Soviet posture during the Cold War, Washington has tried to ensure that its relationship with Pakistan would not disadvantage India.

    Obama’s visit, however, illustrated that this era of evenhandedness was now over. With India’s economic rise, fears of Chinese hegemony, and the unraveling relationship with Pakistan, the US is now pursuing what previously would have been regarded as an asymmetrical foreign policy agenda in South Asia. As part of its new Asia-Pacific strategy, the US is committed to strengthening India in all major sectors of national development, with the hope of making it a global power and a bulwark against Chinese influence in Asia. Meanwhile, Washington is looking for a minimalist relationship with Pakistan, focused almost exclusively on security concerns.

    The US and India are natural allies, but Obama has let China and Pakistan get in the way of New Delhi’s importance. Early signals of this gradual tilt toward India can be found in the final years of the Clinton administration. During his 1999 visit to South Asia, President Clinton spent five days in India, praising the nation’s accomplishments, and mingling with everyday Indians. During his speech to the Indian Parliament, Clinton referred to the US and India as “natural allies” and offered a program for a close partnership in the twenty-first century. In sharp contrast, his stop in Pakistan lasted only five hours and was blemished with security concerns, a refusal to be photographed shaking hands with the country’s military dictator, General Pervez Musharraf (who would become the country’s president in two years), and a blunt warning that Pakistan was increasingly becoming an international pariah.

    The Bush administration took office wanting to take this policy even further by actually de-linking the US’s India and Pakistan policies, and enhancing its relationship with India. As former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage explained to me, “The Bush administration came in with our stated desire to obviously improve relations with India, but also to remove the hyphen from ‘India-Pakistan.’” And the administration did just that. While relations with Pakistan improved dramatically in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, they were based almost exclusively on combating terrorism. On the other hand, relations with India, which deepened more slowly but also more surely, were focused on broad economic, security, and energy sectors. The most significant achievement in this regard was the US-India civilnuclear deal that was announced during President Bush’s 2006 visit to New Delhi. The fact that this agreement was extremely controversial because India, like Pakistan, has not signed on to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, was evidence of the US’s commitment to transforming relations with India and facilitating its rise as a global power.

    This redefinition of regional priorities has continued during the current administration. While the strategic partnership with India continued to be strengthened, Pakistan was declared the source of America’s Afghanistan troubles in the first few months of the Obama presidency. Since then, as mutual mistrust has grown because of policies such as US drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas and Pakistan’s eight-month blockade of NATO supply lines, the US-Pakistan engagement has reached one of its all-time lows. The difference between Washington’s relationship with India and its relationship with Pakistan is best illustrated by the actual words used by members of the administration. While Secretary of State Hillary Clinton describes US-India ties as “an affair of the heart,” Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta characterized relations with Pakistan as “complicated, but necessary.”

    This affair of the heart is hardheaded and unemotional. The defining feature of evolving US-India relations is that, unlike the US and Pakistan, the two countries actually share a number of common interests, and have also managed to create a broad-based partnership centered along deepening trade ties and energy and security cooperation. Bilateral trade and investment are the most significant components of the two countries’ engagement. The US-India trade relationship has become increasingly strong over the past decade-especially after the lifting of US sanctions in 2001-with the result that today the US is India’s thirdlargest trading partner (see Figure 1). India’s industrial and service sectors have now become increasingly linked to the American market. In the first half of 2012 alone, the US imported almost $20 billion worth of goods and $16 billion worth of services from India, while in 2011 US-India bilateral trade in goods and services peaked at almost $86.3 billion. Standing at $18.9 billion in 2001, bilateral trade in goods and services has doubled twice within a decade. This steady rise has made the US one of the largest investors in the Indian economy. According to the Office of the US Trade Representative, US foreign direct investment in India was $27.1 billion in 2010 (latest available data), a thirty-percent increase from 2009. Even Indian FDI in the US increased by forty percent between 2009 and 2010, reaching $3.3 billion.

    It was, of course, cooperation over energy that symbolized the coming-of-age of Indo-American relations. The landmark civil-nuclear deal signed in 2008 was intended to help India meet its growing energy demand through the use of nuclear technology. The US agreed to supply nuclear fuel to India and convince members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to follow suit. In addition to this, the US has also been helping India access oil from suppliers other than Iran, with the aim of reducing Indo-Iranian cooperation.

    Along with deepening economic and energy ties, the two countries’ defense cooperation has also strengthened over the past decade. In addition to closely cooperating with India over counterterrorism and conducting joint military exercises with it since 2007, the US has included India in the “Quad” forum, along with Japan, Australia, and Singapore, thereby making it an integral part of its emerging Asian security architecture. Moreover, during his visit President Obama also announced more than $5 billion worth of military sales to India, adding to the $8 billion of military hardware India had already purchased from US companies between 2007 and 2011. As reported by the Times of India, India will spend almost $100 billion over the next decade to acquire weapons systems and platforms. This push for sales comes partly from the US Defense Department’s strong desire to equip India with modern weaponry, to collaborate with it on high-end defense technology such as unmanned aerial vehicles (“drones”), and to become India’s largest weapons supplier.

    Beyond defense technology, the US and India have also cooperated successfully in space. The joint venture between NASA and the Indian Space Research Organization during India’s Chandrayaan-1 lunar mission, which detected water on the lunar surface for the first time, is a significant example. Moreover, members of the US and Indian public and private sectors have also promoted the idea of cooperation to harness space-based solar power. Finally, the US has offered New Delhi increasingly strong political support as exemplified in Obama’s unequivocal backing of India’s bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Furthermore, despite Pakistan’s request for American assistance in negotiating the Kashmir dispute, the US has yielded to Indian demands that it not get involved. When Richard Holbrooke was appointed the US special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2009, India and Kashmir, as revealed by US officials to the Washington Post, were covered within Holbrooke’s mandate under “related matters.” The Indian government, however, lobbied the Obama administration swiftly and strongly with the result that Kashmir was eliminated from Holbrooke’s portfolio altogether.

    Although the evolving Indo-American partnership is rooted in multiple areas of common interest, from Washington’s perspective one priority looms larger than others in its partnership with India, and that is China. Simply put, India has become a central component in America’s grand strategy to balance Chinese power in Asia. China’s strengthening military capabilities and several moves in Asia, such as its claim of territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea, assertiveness in the Pacific Ocean, and growing naval and commercial presence in the Indian Ocean, have increasingly worried the US. For example, China’s aggressive posture and territorial claims inundated Secretary Clinton’s agenda when she visited the region in September. Further, according to one report, in 2007 a senior Chinese naval officer even suggested to the former US Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Timothy Keating, a plan to limit US naval influence at Hawaii. Moreover, through its “string of pearls” policy China has acquired rights to base or resupply its navy at several ports from Africa though the Middle East and South Asia to the South China Sea.

    Over the last decade Washington has considered several strategies to check Chinese power, with India essential to all of them. The National Security Strategy 2002 made it clear that India could aid the US in creating a “strategically stable Asia.” George Bush’s secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, had also voiced this view in a Foreign Affairs article written during the 2000 presidential campaign. Moreover, a 2011 report by the Council on Foreign Relations and Aspen Institute India argued that “a militarily strong India is a uniquely stabilizing factor in a dynamic twenty-firstcentury Asia.” India’s role in balancing China was most vividly described later on in the Obama administration. The 2012 Defense Strategic Review recognized that China’s rise would affect the US economy and security, and declared that the US “will of necessity rebalance [its military] toward the Asia- Pacific region.” Secretary of State Clinton had previously outlined this policy in greater detail in an article titled “America’s Pacific Century,” explaining that to sustain its global leadership the US would invest militarily, diplomatically, and economically in the Asia-Pacific region. The US security agenda, she highlighted,

    would include countering North Korea’s proliferation efforts, defending “freedom of navigation through the South China Sea,” and ensuring “transparency in the military activities of the region’s key players.” Two of the three objectives, in other words, were targeted directly at China. While in the past the US had projected power into the Asia-Pacific through colonization and occupation-notable examples being Guam and the Philippines in 1898 and Japan after 1945-its new presence is based on creating strong bilateral economic and military alliances with regional countries, and efforts to organize the region into multilateral economic and security institutions to balance China’s economic and military influence. Thus, in addition to strongly supporting the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), America also backs other organizations like the Trans- Pacific Partnership and Pacific Islands Forum, and formal security dialogue groups such as the “Quad” and the US-India-Japan trilateral forum.

    Not only is the US looking to enhance India’s Pacific presence by integrating it into these organizations, but, as described in the Defense Strategic Review, through its long-term goal of helping it become an “economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region.” The grand strategies are in play, but will the US and India be able to manage a strong alliance whose chief objective is enabling the US to effectively accomplish its goals vis-à-vis China? To put the question more simply, will India play the balancing game? And will India also support the US on other foreign policy objectives in Asia?

    The strategic goals of at least a section of the Indian foreign policy elite can be gauged from the report Nonalignment 2.0, published in 2012 by the Center for Policy Research (CPR), an influential Indian think tank. The report’s study group included prominent retired officials such as Ambassador Shyam Saran, who helped negotiate the US-India civil nuclear deal, and Lieutenant General Prakash Menon. The deliberations were also attended by the sitting national security adviser, Shivshanker Menon, and his deputies, thus signaling some level of official endorsement. The report argued that “strategic autonomy” in the international sphere has and should continue to define Indian foreign policy so that India can benefit from a variety of partnerships and economic opportunities to spur internal development, which in turn will propel its rise to great-power status.

    Even if India were to abandon strategic autonomy, as some of the report’s critics advocate, it is essential to note that the Sino-Indian relationship is a little too complex for the sort of balancing game the US played with the USSR during the Cold War. As highlighted by Mohan Malik, the relationship faces several tensions, including territorial disputes, China’s aggressive patrolling of borders, maritime competition, and the race for alliances with littoral states in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. But China also happens to be India’s second-largest trading partner. Sino- Indian bilateral trade in 2011 peaked at almost $74 billion. In short, the relationship is adversarial in certain areas, but symbiotic in others.

    India is also engaged with China in international forums that are often perceived as emerging balancers against US power, such as the India-Russia-China forum and the Brazil-Russia-India-China- South Africa (BRICS) group, which has not only criticized US policies, but also called for replacing the US dollar as the international currency. Furthermore, the Indo-US relationship has troubles of its own, especially in dealing with Iran and Afghanistan, which signal the limits of Indian support for US policies in Asia. Because Iran is a key resource for energy supplies, India has not participated in efforts to pressure Iran economically to curtail its nuclear program. When US sanctions against Iran were heightened in early 2012, Iran and India proposed a plan to barter oil for wheat and other exports. India is also perturbed by the US’s planned departure from Afghanistan in 2014, which it fears may lead to chaos there. Moreover, it is wary of US-Taliban negotiations, afraid that the Taliban’s return to power will put Indian investments in Afghanistan at risk and also offer strategic space to anti-Indian militant groups.

    For these and other reasons, while the US and India share a range of common interests now and have been cooperating in a variety of areas, they still have a long way to go before establishing a truly close partnership. While the growing strength of this relationship is obvious, so are its limitations, and the ultimate nature of this relationship is as yet an open question. India’s global rise and the position it can acquire within US grand strategy is also dependent on things beyond America’s control-its continued economic growth and ability to tackle domestic challenges such as poverty and underdevelopment, infrastructural weaknesses, and multiple insurgent conflicts. It also fundamentally depends on the US’s continued ability to financially and politically afford a strong military and diplomatic presence in Asia. The current strategic commitments of American and Indian policymakers have also placed limits on the relationship. In Washington’s game plan, India is only one country in a larger web of alliancesstretching from India to Japan and Mongolia to Australia-that the US is developing. For its part, New Delhi is not looking to commit to an exclusive alliance with the US, but rather enter into a series of partnerships with a number of countries to gain what it can in terms of resources, trade, and security cooperation.

    Nevertheless, while this affair of the heart may remain unconsummated, both parties are growing more serious about each other and implementing policies to strengthen the strategic partnership. As for the US and Pakistan, they should limit their relationship to cooperation over issues that are truly of common interest. Moreover, though Islamabad will remain uneasy with increasing US-India coziness, this partnership does not necessarily forebode trouble for it. Such an outcome is especially avoidable with continued normalization of diplomatic relations and increased trade relations between India and Pakistan. That the Pakistani military and civilian leaderships are becoming committed to reducing tensions is a welcome sign.

  • CIA director David Petraeus quits over extramarital affair

    CIA director David Petraeus quits over extramarital affair

    WASHINGTON (TIP): David Petraeus, the retired four-star general renowned for taking charge of the military campaigns in Iraq and then Afghanistan, abruptly resigned on November 9 as director of the CIA, admitting to an extramarital affair. The affair was discovered during an FBI investigation, according to officials briefed on the developments.

    They spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to publicly discuss the matter. It was unclear what the FBI was investigating or when it became aware of the affair. Petraeus’ resignation shocked Washington’s intelligence and political communities. It was a sudden end to the public career of the bestknown general of the post 9/11 wars, a man credited with salvaging the US conflict in Iraq and sometimes mentioned as a potential Republican presidential candidate. His service was effusively praised on November 9 in statements from both Republican and Democratic lawmakers. Petraeus, who turned 60 on Wednesday, told CIA employees in a statement that he had met with President Barack Obama at the White House on November 8 and asked to be allowed to resign.

    On Friday, the president accepted. Petraeus told his staffers he was guilty of “extremely poor judgment” in the affair. “Such behavior is unacceptable, both as a husband and as the leader of an organization such as ours.” He has been married for 38 years to Holly Petraeus, whom he met when he was a cadet at the US Military Academy at West Point, New York. She was the daughter of the academy superintendent.

    They have two children, and their son led an infantry platoon in Afghanistan. Obama said in a statement that the retired general had provided “extraordinary service to the United States for decades” and had given a lifetime of service that “made our country safer and stronger.” Obama called him “one of the outstanding general officers of his generation.” The president said that CIA deputy director Michael Morell would serve as acting director.

    Morell was the key CIA aide in the White House to President George W Bush during the Sept 11, 2001, terror attacks. “I am completely confident that the CIA will continue to thrive and carry out its essential mission,” Obama said. The resignation comes at a sensitive time.

    The administration and the CIA have struggled to defend security and intelligence lapses before the attack that killed the US ambassador to Libya and three others.

    It was an issue during the presidential campaign that ended with Obama’s re-election on Tuesday. The CIA has come under intense scrutiny for providing the White House and other administration officials with talking points that led them to say the Benghazi attack was a result of a film protest, not a militant terror attack.

    It has become clear that the CIA was aware the attack was distinct from the film protests roiling across other parts of the Muslim world. Morell rather than Petraeus now is expected to testify at closed congressional briefings next week on the Sept 11 attacks on the consulate in Benghazi. For the director of the CIA, being engaged in an extramarital affair is considered a serious breach of security and a counterintelligence threat.

    If a foreign government had learned of the affair, the reasoning goes, Petraeus or the person with whom he was involved could have been blackmailed or otherwise compromised. Military justice considers conduct such as an extramarital affair to be possible grounds for court martial. Failure to resign also could create the perception for the rank-and-file that such behavior is acceptable.

    At FBI headquarters, spokesman Paul Bresson declined to comment on the information that the affair had been discovered in the course of an investigation by the bureau. Holly Petraeus is known for her work helping military families. She joined the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to set up an office dedicated to helping service members with financial issues.

    Though Obama made no direct mention of Petraeus’ reason for resigning, he offered his thoughts and prayers to the general and his wife, saying that Holly Petraeus had “done so much to help military families through her own work. I wish them the very best at this difficult time.” Petraeus, who became CIA director in September 2011, was known as a shrewd thinker and hard-charging competitor.

    His management style was recently lauded in a Newsweek article by Paula Broadwell, coauthor of the biography, “All In: The Education of General David Petraeus.” The article listed Petraeus’ “rules for living.” No. 5 was: “We all make mistakes.

    The key is to recognize them, to learn from them, and to take off the rear view mirrors – drive on and avoid making them again.” Petraeus told his CIA employees that he treasured his work with them “and I will always regret the circumstances that brought that work with you to an end.” The director of national intelligence, James Clapper, said Petraeus’ departure represented “the loss of one of our nation’s most respected public servants.

    From his long, illustrious Army career to his leadership at the helm of CIA, Dave has redefined what it means to serve and sacrifice for one’s country.” Other CIA directors have resigned under unflattering circumstances.

    CIA director Jim Woolsey left over the discovery of a KGB mole and director John Deutch left after the revelation that he had kept classified information on his home computer. Bush sent Petraeus to Iraq in February 2007, at the peak of sectarian violence, to turn things around as head of U.S. forces. He oversaw an influx of 30,000 US troops and moved troops out of big bases so they could work more closely with Iraqi forces scattered throughout Baghdad.

  • As i see it : Obama Win: Some Indicators

    As i see it : Obama Win: Some Indicators

    President Obama win in 2008 was a truly historic occasion as the election of a non-white to the presidency represented the far reaching social change that had occurred relatively undetected in the American society over the years. His second win consolidates that social transformation. This does not mean, however, that racism has vanished from America’s social landscape.

    Many Republican whites could never fully reconcile themselves with Obama in the White House. The right wing swing of the Republican party after 2008 resulted in political gridlock in the US Congress, especially after the Republicans won a majority in the House of Representatives. This was despite Obama’s genuine efforts to reach a bi-partisan consensus on vital social and financial legislation.

    With this second defeat, bitterness in the Republican camp is set to become more acute. This election has more sharply polarized the country, with white, middle-aged, rural America broadly pitted against the Blacks, Hispanics and young, urban whites. With the Republicans retaining their majority in the House, the political gridlock will continue, making governance in America more difficult. The “fiscal cliff” looming in January 2013 will severely test Obama’s second presidency.

    Obama’s victory is not as “overwhelming” as some claim. His share of the electoral vote, and more particularly, the popular vote has come down, the first time this has happened in 100 years for a second term president. Obama had disappointed his democratic base early into his first presidency by seeking compromises on legislative measures he had promised and his failure to withdraw quickly from Afghanistan etc. In foreign policy, despite an unwarranted Nobel Peace Prize, he broadly continued Bush’s end-of-the-second-term policies. Antipathy towards Romney rather than a full endorsement of Obama seems to have affected the choice of voters.

    For India, Obama’s re-election provides continuity. We are familiar with his attitude and policies towards India. He has a good personal rapport with our Prime Minister. His initial views on Pakistan, Kashmir, terrorism, Afghanistan and China were problematic for us. But he has learned on the job, and today US policies on all these issues are more congenial for us. The US now considers India as the lynchpin of its “re-balancing” towards Asia. This shows the direction of US thinking on its strategic partnership with India.

    The India-US bilateral agenda pursued in Obama’s first tenure is richly textured. The opportunities and the obstacles are known to both sides, with realization that the pace of implementation will be determined by political compulsions. The relationship lacks excitement but is steady. Differences over Iran, Libya and Syria have been delicately balanced, which a Romney victory could have unsettled.

    On outsourcing Obama has remained negative, undeterred by larger political considerations. Visa fees hikes and visa denials to Indian service providers is an irritant. Our IT industry, chary of Obama’s win, fears the president will put tax penalties on US firms that outsource jobs. Obama has alienated the most pro-American segment of the modern, knowledge-based entrepreneurial class in India. Bangalore, a hi-tech job creating symbol of India-US ties in many ways, is presented parochially as a threat to US jobs by Obama.

    Whatever, our grievance on this score, the IT sector cannot be the defining test of the India-US relationship. We will have to keep voicing our concerns to the US, in the expectation that it would also want to contain the fall-out of these differences on the overall bilateral relationship. By squeezing us here, the US will also lose diplomatic ground in canvassing for more economic reforms in India.