The relationship between India and Russia—earlier the Soviet Union—remains one of the most resilient bilateral partnerships in modern international politics. Marked by cordiality, strategic trust, and a deep sense of mutual respect, it is a partnership that has never been transactional, never been opportunistic, and never been shaken by the shifting tides of global politics. If anything, it is a relationship built in crisis, strengthened in adversity, and sustained by consistent political goodwill and people-to-people warmth.
India’s tremendous experience of Russian friendship during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War remains the defining chapter of this partnership. When the United States, under President Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, tilted openly toward Pakistan—including dispatching the nuclear-armed Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengal in an unmistakable show of intimidation—it was the Soviet Union that firmly stood by India. Moscow not only provided diplomatic cover at the United Nations, vetoing a series of anti-India resolutions pushed by the U.S. and its allies, but also sent its own naval fleet to neutralize the American pressure. The Soviet support was so decisive that many Indian strategic scholars note that but for Moscow’s intervention, India may well have lost political ground in Jammu & Kashmir—or at least been forced into an unfavorable ceasefire.
This memory is not lost on New Delhi. Nor has India forgotten the numerous moments at the UN Security Council when Russia’s veto ensured India’s national interests were protected. In fact, Russia has used its UN veto more than half a dozen times since 1957 specifically in cases involving Kashmir or matters affecting India’s security. This steadfastness has shaped India’s long-standing diplomatic gratitude, and to this day, the Kremlin remains India’s most reliable Great Power supporter in multilateral forums.
India, in return, has neither treated Russia as a legacy friend nor as a dispensable one. Its consistent refusal to join Western sanctions regimes—whether after Crimea in 2014 or during the post-2022 American-led sanctions wave—speaks to New Delhi’s clarity: strategic autonomy cannot be compromised for momentary geopolitical fashion. When Washington imposed unprecedented sanctions on Moscow after 2022, India not only maintained its engagement with Russia but expanded its energy ties. At its peak in 2023–24, Russian crude accounted for over 40 percent of India’s oil imports—up from just 1 percent in early 2022. Despite immense pressure from the United States, India insisted that what matters is affordability, energy security, and national interest—not Western geopolitical preferences.
India has since moderately reduced these imports due to tariff changes and commercial dynamics, but the political message remains unmistakable: Russia is a friend India does not abandon.
It is in this context that the red-carpet welcome accorded to President Vladimir Putin in New Delhi on December 4, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s personal gesture of receiving him on the tarmac, must be understood. Modi’s words—describing the partnership as “time-tested” and one that has “greatly benefitted our people”—were not diplomatic niceties but a reiteration of a reality that has defined India’s foreign policy for more than seven decades.
Putin’s visit comes at a particularly complex moment in India–U.S. relations. American dissatisfaction over India’s long-term purchase of discounted Russian crude was only the beginning. President Trump’s return to Washington has been accompanied by what he calls a “fair trade doctrine,” under which India now faces among the world’s highest tariffs imposed by the United States, especially on key exports such as pharmaceuticals, specialty steel, and certain categories of machinery. Add to this the American unease about India’s continued defense posture vis-à-vis Russia, and the picture becomes clear: Indo-U.S. relations are currently undergoing a strain not seen in the last decade.
Yet even in this backdrop, India has chosen not to dilute its strategic engagement with Moscow. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has confirmed that potential Indian purchases of next-generation Russian fighter jets and ballistic missile systems will be a central agenda item during the Modi–Putin talks. While the U.S. may not welcome such deepening defense cooperation, the reality is that nearly 60–70 percent of India’s military platforms even today are of Russian origin. Whether it is the Su-30MKI fighters, T-90 tanks, the nuclear submarine Chakra, or the formidable S-400 air defense system, Russia remains India’s principal and most dependable weapons supplier. Joint ventures like BrahMos, the world’s fastest supersonic cruise missile, further illustrate the depth of technological and strategic synergy that simply cannot be replicated overnight by any Western partner.
The timing of Putin’s visit also reflects a mutual understanding that the global order is in flux. For Russia, India remains one of the few large, independent, and rising powers that has not aligned itself with either the Western bloc or the Sino-Russian axis. For India, Russia remains a crucial pillar in maintaining a multipolar Asia and ensuring that New Delhi retains flexibility in balancing Western partnerships with its own national interests.
How America views this visit—and how it interprets the outcomes of the Modi–Putin dialogue—will be closely watched by the rest of the world. Washington has historically viewed India–Russia engagement through the lens of its own geopolitical struggles, whether during the Cold War or in the current era of great-power rivalry with China and Russia. But the United States must accept an essential truth: India does not believe in exclusive relationships. New Delhi’s global partnerships are guided by sovereignty, strategic autonomy, and the pursuit of a balanced multipolar order—not by pressure tactics or ideological camps.
India will continue to deepen ties with the United States in trade, technology, education, and defense interoperability. But that will not come at the cost of its historic and strategic relationship with Russia.
In fact, Putin’s 2025 visit may well become the moment India–Russia relations receive a fresh infusion of energy. Aside from defense ties, both sides are exploring expansion in the North–South Transport Corridor, cooperation in civil nuclear energy, space technology, and new investments in the Russian Far East—a region where India has already pledged significant economic participation. Cultural and educational exchanges, too, are likely to rise as Moscow views India as a long-term partner in the emerging non-West-led economic order.
What remains certain is that Putin’s visit will strengthen—not merely symbolize—the India–Russia partnership. In an era when alliances shift overnight and global politics is defined by volatility, the India–Russia relationship remains a model of consistency and trust. It has weathered wars, sanctions, diplomatic storms, and vast changes in leadership on both sides. And it has emerged stronger each time.
As the world watches Modi and Putin meet once again, the message is unmistakable: there are friendships in global diplomacy that are built not on convenience, but on conviction—and the India–Russia partnership is one of them.
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