The Indian Panorama

Tag: Lt Gen DS Hooda

  • The real drone war is yet to come

    The real drone war is yet to come

    Preparing for the future means thinking beyond the victories of Operation Sindoor

    “An effective counter-drone system must address both tactical and operational levels. Frontline troops must be equipped with portable jammers and rifle-mounted AI-assisted sights. At the operational level, the most effective architectures integrate long-range detection by radar and other sensors, mid-range disruption through jamming or spoofing, and close-in destruction by kinetic means. We may also need to examine new organizational structures that integrate radars, guns and Electronic Warfare resources.”

    By Lt Gen DS Hooda (Retd)

    It’s now over two months since Operation Sindoor, and with the media frenzy having subsided, a dispassionate assessment can be made of some of the key military issues surrounding the operation. One of these issues is the description of the conflict as South Asia’s first drone war. Senior Indian military officers have spoken about the revolutionary employment of drones during the operation and the effectiveness of India’s counter-drone systems.

    Drones have undoubtedly become central to modern conflict, and India’s successful defense against Pakistani intrusions has been justifiably praised. Yet a closer analysis of drone employment during the operation shows that drone warfare in both countries is still at a nascent stage. This is borne out by how the two countries utilized drones during the operation.

    On the night of May 7-8, a day after India launched strikes on nine terrorist camps, Pakistan retaliated with drone activity, targeting Indian military bases at 15 locations across Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Gujarat, and Rajasthan. The following night saw further intrusions at 36 locations, stretching from Leh to Sir Creek, with an estimated 300 to 400 drones. According to official briefings, the aim of these incursions was likely to test Indian air defense systems and gather intelligence.

    On the night of May 9-10, drone activity was reported at 26 locations, spanning from Srinagar to Naliya. Most of these drones were successfully neutralized, though limited damage was sustained at Udhampur, Pathankot, Adampur and Bhuj.

    According to media reports, most of the drones employed by Pakistan were unarmed. A few specialized military drones, such as Turkey’s Asisguard Songar and the Yiha-III loitering munition, were used. The Songar has a range of about 10 km and can be equipped with a light armament, such as a gun or grenade launcher. The Yiha-III is designed for precision strikes against high-value targets, but it remains a low-end capability compared to more sophisticated systems.

    Indian drone strikes, though fewer in number, were more targeted and precise. These employed loitering munitions such as the Harpy and Harop. The Harpy is an anti-radiation drone designed to destroy enemy radar systems, while the Harop has electro-optical sensors and can engage a broader range of targets. Polish Warmate and the indigenously developed Nagastra-1 loitering munitions were also employed.

    It is likely that some of the Indian strikes on terrorist camps on May 7 were carried out by drones, though this has not been officially confirmed. What has been revealed through press briefings is that on May 8, Indian drones targeted air defense radars and systems at multiple locations inside Pakistan, destroying one radar in Lahore. On May 9, four more air defense sites were targeted, with at least one additional radar destroyed.

    On May 10, the Indian Air Force launched devastating airstrikes on Pakistani airbases, command centers and military infrastructure using long-range standoff weapons such as the BrahMos and SCALP cruise missiles, and air-to-ground munitions like the Crystal Maze and Rampage. These strikes were preceded by decoy drones and Harops designed to degrade Pakistani air defense systems.

    On the counter-drone front, Pakistan claimed to have downed at least 48 Indian drones. The Indian counter-drone effort was commendable as it neutralized almost all Pakistani drone attacks. At the forefront were air defense guns like the L-70, ZU-23 and Shilka. India also has an indigenous Drone Detection and Interdiction System that would have played an important part in neutralizing hostile drones.

    India did come out on top in the brief drone war, but there are some important lessons. The reason drones are having such a significant impact on the battlefield is due to their affordability and ubiquity. Thousands of $500 drones in the hands of soldiers make aerial surveillance, precision strikes and real-time intelligence accessible to even small infantry units. Low-cost drones also permit strategic reach, as seen in Ukraine’s deep strikes into Russia.

    It is not technology, but the scale of drone warfare that is redefining warfighting. Both Ukraine and Russia are estimated to have between one and two million drones in their military inventory. It is the mass usage that is the fundamental characteristic of drone warfare, and this has sparked innovation in tactics and battlefield adaptation.

    One might argue that a four-day conflict between India and Pakistan cannot be compared to the Ukraine war. There is merit in this argument, but then we should also not conclude that the Sindoor experience offers a reliable blueprint for future conflicts involving drones. In fact, it highlights several areas that must be addressed.

    Indian drone strikes were precise but primarily carried out by specialized drones. Such drones are highly expensive; each Harop drone costs approximately $700,000. What is required is a massive infusion of low-cost drones, particularly in the Army. Units at the tactical level must then devise practical doctrines and battlefield tactics for their effective employment.

    India must also indigenously develop medium and long-range strike drones. Ukraine has developed a series of drones with ranges of up to 1,000 km, which transitioned from concept to combat use in around six months. While this wartime mobilization is not replicable in India, drone development timelines must be drastically shortened through mission-mode programs and agile public-private partnerships.

    The military must also not rest on its laurels of having countered Pakistani drones. With few exceptions, the drones were mostly unarmed and posed little direct threat. An effective counter-drone system must address both tactical and operational levels. Frontline troops must be equipped with portable jammers and rifle-mounted AI-assisted sights. At the operational level, the most effective architectures integrate long-range detection by radar and other sensors, mid-range disruption through jamming or spoofing, and close-in destruction by kinetic means. We may also need to examine new organizational structures that integrate radars, guns and Electronic Warfare resources.

    Preparing for the future means thinking beyond the victories of Operation Sindoor. It requires scaling up the employment of drones, rewriting doctrine and integrating drone defenses into every level of the battlefield. The real drone war is yet to come.

    (Lt Gen DS Hooda (retd) is a former Northern Army Commander. He was the Northern Army Commander during the ‘surgical strike’ in September 2016)

  • Drones are changing war and India must catch up

    Drones are changing war and India must catch up

    • The Indian military will have to evolve a comprehensive doctrine around drone warfare.
    • Fundamental changes would have to be made in how the Army fights.

    “Today, small quadcopters costing less than $1,000 dominate the tactical battlefield, carrying out a variety of roles —intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and kinetic strikes. This omnipresence of drones has dramatically compressed the kill chain: spotting a target and directing fire on it is often done in just minutes or even seconds. A February 2025 study by the Royal United Services Institute estimates that tactical drones account for 60 to 70 per cent of the damaged and destroyed Russian systems.”

    By Lt Gen DS Hooda retd.

    In a seminar hosted by the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies on March 10, General Anil Chauhan, India’s Chief of Defense Staff, emphasized the transformative role of unmanned aerial systems, commonly known as drones, in modern warfare and called for doctrinal clarity on the employment of drones.

    Drones have been around for decades in the military arsenal of countries. What is new is the extensive use of drones in the Russia-Ukraine war, from the tactical battlefield to achieving strategic effects. As the Indian military increasingly looks to induct drones into service, key insights from the Ukraine conflict should guide this effort.

    The start of the Ukraine war saw the traditional employment of large, slow-flying drones, like Ukraine’s Bayraktar TB2 and Russia’s Orion, in surveillance and strike roles. However, these drones were vulnerable to air defense systems and soon disappeared from the skies, replaced by smaller military drones, like the Ukrainian Furia and the Russian Orlan-10.

    The real transformation occurred when Ukraine turned to commercial off-the-shelf drones, repurposing thousands of them as combat tools. By the war’s second year, drone operations had massively expanded in scale and sophistication. In 2023, the Ukrainian army raised over 60 special drone strike units embedded in combat brigades and independent drone groups, institutionalizing drone warfare.

    With the increasing role of drones on the battlefield, their numbers expanded exponentially. Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukraine’s commander-in-chief, said over 1.3 million drones had been delivered to frontline soldiers in 2024. Russian President Vladimir Putin has stated that Russia was ramping up its drone production to nearly 1.4 million in 2024, a tenfold increase from the previous year.

    Today, small quadcopters costing less than $1,000 dominate the tactical battlefield, carrying out a variety of roles —intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and kinetic strikes. This omnipresence of drones has dramatically compressed the kill chain: spotting a target and directing fire on it is often done in just minutes or even seconds. A February 2025 study by the Royal United Services Institute estimates that tactical drones account for 60 to 70 per cent of the damaged and destroyed Russian systems.

    Russia’s success in driving Ukrainian forces out of Kursk in March 2025 has been attributed to the mass employment of fiber-optic drones. These drones are tethered to their operator via a physical cable and are immune to electronic jamming. Ukraine troops described their retreat from Kursk as a “horror movie” as drones “hunted them day and night.”

    Drones have also had strategic impacts away from the frontlines. Ukrainian uncrewed surface drones (USVs) have sunk Russian warships, compelling Russia to relocate much of its Black Sea fleet to ports like Novorossiysk, effectively ceding control of large parts of the Black Sea. USVs carrying drones have attacked Russian gas platforms and other targets around the Black Sea.

    As drones proliferate in the Indian military, they must not be treated as standalone assets but integrated into a combined arms operation. The control of thousands of drones in the sky will require a network-centric approach to manage the information overload. Ukraine has adopted the DELTA system, which integrates data from multiple sources, including drone video feeds, open-source intelligence and satellite imagery, to present a real-time picture to commanders, enabling quick targeting.

    A current deficit in India’s military power is the limited inventory of conventional missiles for engaging targets deep in enemy territory. Long-range strike drones can fill this gap. According to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Russia carried out 8,484-long-range strikes against Ukraine between September and December 2024. More than 90 per cent of these strikes were carried out by attack drones, mostly Shahed drones imported from Iran. While relatively slow and often intercepted, the Shaheds are cheap (about $35,000 each) and are being used in large numbers as expendable cruise missiles. As a comparison, Russian missiles like the ground-launched Iskander and air-launched.

    Technology sans doctrine is of little use. The Indian military will have to evolve a comprehensive doctrine around drone warfare. Constant surveillance over the battlefield and the ability to quickly hit individual targets is forcing troops to disperse and remain hidden, making mass surprise attacks difficult. The operational tempo and decision cycles have compressed, requiring greater delegation and initiative from local commanders. Fundamental changes would have to be made in how the Army fights.

    In a highly contested airspace and a plethora of air defense systems, drones will play a key role in deep observation and targeting. The Air Force will have to develop doctrines for manned-unmanned teaming of fighter aircraft and drones. The drones will carry out the role of surveillance, electronic warfare and other risky tasks while the manned aircraft deliver strategic strikes. Strategies will also have to be formulated for defending airspace from mass drone attacks. An effective defense will require a layered approach, combining detection, disruption and destruction, with electronic warfare as a critical component.

    The Navy will have to integrate drones as strategic strike assets while reviewing the concept of coastal and harbor defense to protect from attacks by surface or underwater drones. Like the Air Force, the Navy must look at the concept of manned-unmanned teaming in fleets.

    Organizational changes must accompany doctrinal development. Merely allocating drones to existing units will result in suboptimal employment. Specialized drone units will have to be created within all three services and there will be a requirement to raise additional electronic warfare and counter-drone units.

    Such a proliferation of roles will require mass manufacturing of drones and production capacity will have to be ramped up quickly. This necessitates an extensive participation of the civil sector and changes in the defense procurement process to make it more agile.

    The jury is still out on whether drones have completely transformed how future wars will be fought, but it is a reality that drone warfare has become a central feature of modern combat. The Indian military must put doctrines and organizational structures in place to exploit this new weapon of war.

    (The author is a former Northern Army Commander)