The Indian Panorama

Tag: NSS

  • The ‘Donroe doctrine’, a broken international order

    The ‘Donroe doctrine’, a broken international order

    It is a mixed bag as far as the global outlook for 2026 is concerned, marked by an updated version of the U.S.’s ‘shock and awe’ tactics

    By M K Narayanan

    The new year began with a stark reminder that the over 200-year-old ‘Monroe Doctrine’ is not merely alive but has been given a fresh dimension, in keeping with the personality of United States President Donald Trump. In a swift operation as 2026 unfolded, U.S. airborne troops abducted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife and incarcerated them in the U.S. on charges of undermining the security of the U.S. This action is being sanctified as the new ‘Donroe Doctrine’.

    Actions under the Trump administration

    Protests worldwide against the U.S.’s action in violating the sovereignty of Venezuela have, however, been rather muted. This seems to convey the belief that the post-1945 international order is dead, and what exists now is a ‘free for all’ in the global commons. Voices are also being heard ‘sotto voce’, that the latest action by the U.S. might well become a prelude for similar actions by nations such as China and Russia to lay claim to countries and regions falling within their zone of influence — China’s claim to Taiwan being one.

    The action carried out has been characterized by Mr Trump himself as a modern version of the (1823) Monroe Doctrine, viz., that the U.S. is the sole guarantor of security in the Western Hemisphere and would not brook any interference by powers outside the Hemisphere. A careful reading of President Trump’s latest U.S. National Security Strategy, or NSS (November 2025) — which unequivocally states that after years of neglect, the U.S. expects to reassert its pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere, denying non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or threaten U.S. vital assets in the Hemisphere — would suggest that the Venezuelan operation was a carefully thought through maneuver, and an updated 21st century version of ‘US shock and awe’ tactics. There is even an implicit threat of actions similar to Venezuela against Cuba, Colombia and Mexico. There is again an implicit reference to taking control of Greenland which is viewed by the U.S. as a security necessity.

    From a U.S. perspective, it would seem that 2026 could see significant changes in different regions of the globe. Europe, for instance, which has come in for sharp criticism in the NSS document, has been excoriated on the ground that it had lost most, if not all, its sheen, alongside the suggestion that the U.S. could help Europe regain its former greatness if it backed patriotic European parties and ‘genuine democracy’. The NSS document wants Europe to assume ‘primary responsibility for its own defense’, alongside a veiled reference to achieving strategic stability with Russia.

    Going beyond Mr. Trump’s NSS, realistically speaking, it would seem that the conflict in Ukraine, which appears stalemated at present, could move toward resolution, but which could be unsatisfactory to both sets of antagonists. The alternative, according to U.S. policymakers, appears to be that otherwise, it could lead to further escalation, alongside fears that it would engulf more regions of Europe.

    The situation closer to India

    The situation in West Asia, it would seem, is beginning to resemble the proverbial curate’s egg, good in parts. Israel’s pogrom has come to an end for the present, but peace in the regime remains highly elusive. The situation in Gaza, in particular, remains highly sensitive and violence seems for the most part just round the corner.

    Meantime, the growing violence and unrest that have engulfed Iran and the Khamenei regime is acting as a catalyst for a fresh round of conflict in and across the region. Iran is witnessing widespread internal violence, and the declared that it is “fighting on four fronts, viz., an economic war, a psychological war, a military war against the US and Israel, and ‘a war on terrorism’”. The West has responded with warnings of imposing additional sanctions on Iran. Implicit in all this, is that both Israel and the U.S. see an opportunity to complete the unfinished conflict of 2025, and ensure that it reaches a ‘satisfactory conclusion’ in undermining the Khamenei regime in Iran.

    Northwest Asia, specially Afghanistan, is meanwhile, set to confront more troubles this year. The Tehreek-e-Taliban and other Afghan terrorist groups appear, of late, to have gained a fresh lease of life, and this spells problems for Pakistan as well. The Afghanistan-Pakistan border will, hence, continue to remain troubled during much of this year. So, 2026 is again, not likely to be a good year for democracy in Pakistan, with the military taking firmer control of the country’s affairs and Field Marshal Asim Munir eclipsing the importance of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, striking another blow to the country’s democratic trajectory. However, Pakistan does appear to have gained a fresh lease of life, with the U.S. embracing it as an ally, promising a fresh tranche of state-of-the-art weapons, and in some ways being perceived as ‘the most favored nation of the US’ in this part of the world. Meantime, uncertainty about the future of democracy will continue to prevail in the highly troubled state of Bangladesh, notwithstanding the promise of fresh elections and restoration of an elected government.

    For China, 2025 seemed like a good year. While China-U.S. rivalry appeared to intensify, Beijing successfully withstood the tariff barrage unleashed by Mr. Trump, and even seemed to turn it to its advantage. China raised the value of its manufacturing and also demonstrated its hold over global supply chains.

    China’s restrictions on rare earth exports in the tussle with the U.S., seemed to enhance its ability to not only withstand U.S. pressures but also to convert the situation in its favor. While there were few opportunities for a trial of strength in the Pacific, China’s growing presence in Southeast Asia is adding to China’s importance in Asian and world affairs. It is increasingly becoming apparent as well that the Eastern Pacific is no longer a U.S. bailiwick. China’s presence in the Indian Ocean is also growing and represents not only a major threat to nations bordering the Indian Ocean but, more importantly, also a challenge to U.S. supremacy here.

    Notes for New Delhi

    As 2026 progresses, India appears to stand at the crossroads, unsure as to where it stands. There has been no letup in Mr. Trump’s tirade against India for continuing to import subsidized Russian oil, notwithstanding the fact that India is inclined to side with the U.S. on most matters. An implicit coldness in India-U.S. relations seems to be affecting India’s relations with many other countries, resulting in New Delhi’s relative isolation when it comes to conflict zones such as West Asia. Mr. Trump’s public endorsement of Field Marshal Munir and the lifting of restrictions on arms supplies to Pakistan is also not helping. Despite this, there have been some positive developments with regard to an expansion of India-U.S. cooperation in some areas. Several mini-lateral initiatives, such as the I2U2 (India, Israel, the U.S., the UAE) and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor appear to be progressing.

    As of now, Washington’s foreign policy calculus and Beijing’s disinterested approach to India are putting India at a disadvantage in political and economic terms, especially the latter. China’s tactical advantage in trade and tariff disputes leaves little room or scope for India to hedge against U.S. threats to further raise tariffs on trade, thus aggravating current anxieties. For India, there is again little room for comfort in the fact that China’s economic growth has not picked up of late, or that its domestic consumption remains stagnant. All this is notwithstanding an improvement in India-China ties following the Tianjin meeting of Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping in 2025. A further stabilization of India-China ties does not, however, appear likely in 2026.

    Overall, 2026 may not have any great prospects for India. It may not, however, face any major terror attack during the year, but terrorism will remain an ever-present reality. West Asia having just undergone a sustained military campaign by Israel may be spared major terror attacks, but the upheaval in Iran and the attempt by Israel and the U.S. to wade into troubled waters could instigate some terror attacks. The Islamic State and al Qaeda seem better positioned in Africa as of now, but this is no reason to let one’s guard down, as, overall, more attacks by insurgent and terrorist entities can be anticipated in Asia, West Asia and Africa. Terrorism could, hence, be regarded as a critical national security threat during 2026.

    (M.K. Narayanan is a former Director, Intelligence Bureau, a former National Security Adviser, and a former Governor of West Bengal)

  • The MAGA turn: Global fallout and India’s dilemma

    The MAGA turn: Global fallout and India’s dilemma

    India cannot blame Western xenophobia while succumbing to it at home

    “Normally, domestic and foreign policies of countries are inter-related. The Trump administration demonstrates that by aligning its foreign policy with its MAGA supremacism. The BJP managed to largely insulate domestic politics from foreign policy, except in South Asia. While adopting nationalist-majoritarian politics at home, with boundaries between religion and politics removed, its foreign policy continued the old secular line, at least superficially. The US State Department’s reports on human rights practices in India berated the constriction of religious, individual and press freedoms. The 2024 report listed the Citizenship Amendment Act and anti-conversion laws as raising concerns. It, however, ignored the BJP’s non-liberal political trajectory weakening democracy. India-US relations were considered more crucial to the global American strategy.”

    By KC Singh

    US President Donald Trump completes one year in office on January 20. The Economist magazine says he has “turned domestic and international politics on its head”. During the campaign, he looked past Project 2025, produced by the conservative Heritage Foundation. However, in office his barrage of executive orders began implementing Project 2025. This included mass, forceful deportation of suspected aliens without hearing, domestic military involvement (now halted by the Supreme Court), dismantling of the bureaucracy, outsourced to Elon Musk, whose Department of Government Efficiency failed drastically.

    The external policy changes began with the April “Liberation Day” arbitrary tariffs on imports. Then emerged a closer alignment with Israel, a pro-Russia tilt in handling the Ukraine war, an escalated trade standoff with China and a transitory compromise. European NATO allies played along, preferring non-confrontation while examining self-reliance, to manage the US pullback from defense commitments. The National Security Strategy (NSS) of December 4-5 confirmed major US policy mutations.

    The new foreign policy priorities list the “Western Hemisphere” on the top. It refers to the Americas — North and South — resurrecting the 19th century’s Monroe Doctrine, which barred European rivals from interfering in Latin-American affairs. Next comes Asia, with focus on the Indo-Pacific. Unlike the past NSS documents, China is not named as a threat, though it colors the Asian strategy. On December 8, the US allowed the sale to China of Nvidia’s advanced H200 chips.

    India figures as a subtext, expected to help ensure Indo-Pacific security. Then follows Europe. Under the subtitle “Promoting European Greatness”, the NSS document argues that the European challenge exceeds economic stagnation and low military spending. The “real and more stark” prospect is of “civilizational erasure” due to migration policies. Europe’s loss of self-confidence is attributed to the regulatory check on the “growing influence of patriotic parties”. This refers to the far-right’s ascendancy in major European nations. This theory is MAGA-inspired, with the US administration desiring a “new Western order”, dominated by governments led by white Christian nationalist-populists.

    In the UK, the Nigel Farage-led Reform UK is polling 30 per cent support; while in France, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally is at 33.4 per cent and Germany’s AfD is scaling 26 per cent. Europeans saw this support-signaling as regrettable interference in their internal affairs. German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul retorted that they did not “need to get advice from any other country or party”. German intelligence sees AfD as an extremist group.

    In this disrupted post-1945 global order, where does India fit? Normally, domestic and foreign policies of countries are inter-related. The Trump administration demonstrates that by aligning its foreign policy with its MAGA supremacism. The BJP managed to largely insulate domestic politics from foreign policy, except in South Asia. While adopting nationalist-majoritarian politics at home, with boundaries between religion and politics removed, its foreign policy continued the old secular line, at least superficially. The US State Department’s reports on human rights practices in India berated the constriction of religious, individual and press freedoms. The 2024 report listed the Citizenship Amendment Act and anti-conversion laws as raising concerns. It, however, ignored the BJP’s non-liberal political trajectory weakening democracy. India-US relations were considered more crucial to the global American strategy.

    The BJP would welcome the NSS document now, recommending non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. The US bureaucracy handling those issues stands disbanded. But domestically, the rising xenophobia in the US is impacting the Indian diaspora, especially their religious practices. The New York Times wrote about the troubles of Sikh truck drivers in the US after two August accidents. Sikhs in the trucking business, many on asylum-related visas, number 1,50,000, probably a quarter of the Sikh diaspora. Federal authorities have asked states like California to review their driving license policy. Canada and Australia have capped student visas, raised fees, heightened scrutiny of forms, etc. The transition to work visas may also be tightened. In New Zealand, a Sikh religious procession was last month disrupted by a far-right Christian group.

    The rising xenophobia in Christian Anglophone and western nations raises concerns. The BJP surely realizes that Hindu groups in India targeting Christians, particularly this year, can provoke retaliation against the Hindu diaspora. Occasional lynchings of Muslims did not impact India’s relations with the Islamic world because the Modi government had successfully engaged the principal Gulf-ruling families. Pakistan only had Turkey and an isolated Iran to join the condemnation. A divided Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) lacked the thrust to target India. But Pakistan stands diplomatically revived after wooing Trump and engaging Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It is now better positioned for India-baiting.

    Plus, Bangladesh may elect next month a right-wing government, probably under Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami’s influence. Pakistan and its ISI would celebrate that. Simultaneously, Assam and West Bengal face elections. Communal polarization helps the BJP electorally, especially by brandishing Bangladeshi illegal migration. Can India blame the western xenophobia while succumbing to it internally?

    Punjab may suffer if deportations from the US mount. Narrowing opportunities abroad will block the Punjabi youth’s escape route. Thus, Punjab must develop economic opportunities. Green Revolution 2.0 is overdue. The agricultural and dairy sectors need production and supply chain modernization. If over two lakh Sikhs could salvage the Italian dairy industry and parmesan cheese production, why not the same in Punjab? Similarly pioneering work exists in turning rice stubble into biofuel and organic fertilizer. The chemical fertilizer lobby suppresses such new approaches.

    Punjab needs pro-innovation leadership. Delhi requires non-partisan statesmanship.

     (K.C. Singh is a retired diplomat)

     

  • A multipolar world with bipolar characteristics

    A multipolar world with bipolar characteristics

    The three great powers understand that the world is no longer organized around a single center of authority

    By Stanly Johny

    As 2025 draws to a close, a highlight is that the United States has undertaken its largest troop mobilization in the Caribbean in decades. Its Navy has deployed its most advanced aircraft carrier, along with fighter jets, amphibious vessels, attack submarines and tens of thousands of troops, as it intensifies its pressure on Venezuela in an effort to force President Nicolás Maduro from power.

    The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS), released in early December 2025, identifies Latin America and the Caribbean as a strategic priority. Reviving the 19th century Monroe Doctrine, the document asserts that the U.S. must deny influence or control by outside powers (read China) in Latin America and ensure that the Western Hemisphere remains under American political, economic and military influence.

    The push to reinforce American primacy in Latin America coincides with U.S. President Donald Trump’s waning interest in Europe, another long-standing U.S. sphere of influence. Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. has served as Europe’s primary security guarantor. If Washington kept western Europe together through a tightly knit alliance during the Cold War, it expanded this security umbrella to eastern Europe after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, creating a large transatlantic bloc. Under Mr. Trump, however, the U.S. is no longer interested in shouldering the burden of European security — a position explicitly articulated in the NSS. Why is America, at a moment when Russia and China are seeking to overturn the U.S.-built and U.S.-led security and economic order, stepping back from Europe while moving to consolidate its influence in the Western Hemisphere?

    It is difficult to discern a cohesive doctrine in Mr. Trump’s foreign policy, marked by the President’s impulses and unpredictability. Yet, even these impulses, this unpredictability and his ideological orientation rooted in Christian nationalism and America’s might cannot ignore the structural shifts reshaping the international order. Mr. Trump is not the ‘President of peace’ that he claims to be — he has already bombed six countries, even if he has stopped short of a full-scale war.

    At the same time, Mr. Trump, despite his rhetoric about American military and economic dominance, recognizes that he no longer lives in a unipolar world. His reluctant aggression and strategic recalibration are reflections of the changes now taking shape in the global balance of power.

    Three great powers

    When the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, a new order emerged with the U.S. at its center. There was no other great power positioned to challenge American primacy. The unipolar moment, however, has since passed. While future historians may better identify the precise point of rupture, one such moment was Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. The ensuing conflict in eastern Ukraine, the tepid western response, and Russia’s ability to endure despite sanctions reinforced the limits of the ‘rules-based order’.

    The end of unipolarity, however, does not mean the end of American dominance. The U.S. remains, and will remain, for the foreseeable future, the world’s pre-eminent military and economic power. What has changed is that Washington is no longer the sole great power shaping geopolitical outcomes. China and Russia now occupy that space as well, deepening what Realist thinkers describe as the inherently anarchic nature of the international system.

    During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was America’s principal rival, and in the 1970s, Washington reached out to China to exploit fissures within the communist bloc. Today, the U.S. identifies China as its principal and systemic challenger. This, in turn, leaves open the possibility of a reset in ties with Russia — an idea embraced by Mr. Trump’s MAGA (Make America Great Again) ideologues, who frame Russia as part of a shared ‘Christian civilization’.

    The reigning power versus the rising power

    The U.S. faces a unique challenge in China. The Soviet economy, in its prime in the early 1970s, reached about 57% of the U.S. GDP, before it began slowing down. China’s economy, now the world’s second largest, already amounts to about 66% of the U.S. economy. China continues to grow at a faster pace, steadily narrowing the gap.

    As China’s economic power expands, it is being converted into military capability (it has already built the world’s largest Navy, by number of ships). Like other great powers, Beijing is seeking to establish regional hegemony and global dominance. So, a prolonged contest between the U.S., the reigning power, and China, the rising power, appears unavoidable. The situation is comparable to 19th century Europe, when a rising imperial Germany threatened to upstage Britain during Pax Britannica, unsettling the ‘Concert of Europe’.

    Russia is the weakest link among the three powers. It is a relatively smaller economy with a shrinking sphere of influence. But Russia’s nuclear arsenals, expansive geography, abundant energy and mineral resources and its demonstrated willingness to use force to achieve its strategic objectives keep it in the great power constellation. From Moscow’s perspective, the country drifted into the wilderness in the 1990s before announcing its return in 2008 with the war in Georgia. Since then, it has sought to rewrite the post-Soviet security architecture in Europe. As the West, having expanded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into the Russian sphere of influence, responded to Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine with sweeping sanctions on Russia and military support for Kyiv, Moscow moved ever closer to China. Russia and China have found common ground in opposing the western ‘rules-based order’ — Russia thinks that the order denies it its rightful place in the world and seeks to revise it accordingly, while China, by contrast, as Rush Doshi argues in The Long Game, wants to replace it with a China-centric order. 

    Fluid multipolarity

    All three great powers today understand that the world is no longer organized around a single center of authority. In that sense, the world is already multipolar. But unlike the post-Second World War and post-Cold War transitions, the structures of the new order have yet to fully emerge. During the Cold War, the world was divided into two ideological blocs and two largely separate economic systems. Today, China lacks the kind of satellite state networks that characterized the 20th century superpowers, while the U.S. is reassessing the sustainability of its alliance frameworks, including its commitment to Europe.

    Russia, with its own great power ambitions, is wary of being seen as a Chinese ally irrespective of its close strategic partnership with Beijing. This opens a window for a Washington-Moscow reset. But the war in Ukraine remains a stumbling block. Russia may not want to challenge America’s global leadership, but it certainly wants to re-establish its primacy in its sphere of influence.

    Thus, there are three great powers with divergent interests that are pulling the global order in different directions, rendering the emerging multipolarity fluid rather than as a structured system akin to the post-Second World War order. This also means that middle powers, including superpower allies such as Japan and Germany, and autonomous actors such as India and Brazil, would continue to hedge their bets.

    Mr. Trump wants Europe to shoulder greater responsibility for its own security, reset relations with Russia and reassert American primacy in its immediate neighborhood even as Washington prepares for a prolonged great power competition with China. The idea is to return to the classic offshore balancing. Even if Mr. Trump fails in executing it, future American Presidents may not be able to ignore the shifts that he has initiated. Russia, for its part, seeks to carve out a sphere of influence. China aims to preserve its close strategic partnership with Russia to keep the Eurasian landmass within its orbit, while establishing regional hegemony in East and Southeast Asia — moves that would cement its status as a long-term superpower, much as the U.S. did by asserting its hegemony in the Western Hemisphere in the 19th century, and across the Atlantic in the 20th century. In this fluid landscape, Russia has emerged as the new ‘swing great power’ between the two superpowers, paradoxically lending the emerging multipolar order a distinctly bipolar character.

    (Stanly Johny is editor with The Hindu. Article republished courtesy The Hindu) 

  • 2025 : The year of Trumpism

    2025 : The year of Trumpism

    US-India relations have sunk to a new low, with the Cold War era distrust returning

    “As for the NSS, three things have so far been clarified. First, that Trump would like to, as it were, ‘circle the wagons’ and secure control over the western hemisphere, declaring North and South America as “out of bounds” for “outside” powers. In some ways, this mirrors views in Asia that believe the US is an “outside” power in this part of the world. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that Trump would have US forces retreat from Asia and hand over the security of the region to regional powers.”

    By Sanjay Baru

    There is little doubt that US President Donald Trump dominated world headlines in 2025. He did so on five different fronts: first, with his ‘America First’ and ‘Make America Great Again’ policy that has not only had an impact on US domestic politics and economics but also on global trade, migration and investment flows; second, with his tariff war and the use of tariffs as a geo-economic weapon; third, by seeking to inject himself into various bilateral conflicts around the world, from South, West and South-east Asia to Europe; fourth, by altering the equation between the US, China and Russia, seeking a G-2 with the former and a détente with the latter; and, finally, by becoming the subject of investigations and news headlines about his sex life.

    Most recently, the focus has been on the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS). Scores of papers and articles have been written worldwide commenting on this document. It has been described as a new Monroe Doctrine, not only asserting the primacy of the Western Hemisphere in American security strategy but also proposing military action in the region to defend those interests.

    How important this stated strategy would be in influencing the actual behaviour of the US on the diplomatic and military fronts remains to be seen. In India, much of the commentary has been on the NSS view of US-India relations and India’s place in Trump’s worldview and ‘grand strategy’. It has been noted widely that US-India relations have sunk to a new low, with the distrust of the Cold War era returning, especially in the nature of the relationship at the leadership level.

    In Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s time, the unprintable language in which President Richard Nixon spoke about her and India remained within closed doors and sealed papers till the confidentiality was broken and various memoirs recorded the low level of discourse in Washington, DC, about India and its leadership. Today, most of what is said is on television and social media. This has cast a long shadow on the relationship.

    As for the NSS, three things have so far been clarified. First, that Trump would like to, as it were, ‘circle the wagons’ and secure control over the western hemisphere, declaring North and South America as “out of bounds” for “outside” powers. In some ways, this mirrors views in Asia that believe the US is an “outside” power in this part of the world. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that Trump would have US forces retreat from Asia and hand over the security of the region to regional powers.

    Second, Trump has prioritised US relations with China above all else. China is both a challenge and a power to deal with. His tweet about the idea of a G2 — Group of Two — set the cat among Asian pigeons. He would like the war in Europe to end more or less on Russia’s terms, thereby further promoting the implicit view that the three Big Powers are entitled to their spheres of influence and security. These approaches have implications for India.

    Finally, many in India and overseas, especially in Europe, have interpreted the NSS as a statement of American retrenchment. This particular conclusion is a misinterpretation of Trump’s worldview and exaggerates the possibility of American retrenchment.

    Consider the fact that nowhere in the NSS is there any statement proposing retrenchment as far as the real projection of American power worldwide is concerned, namely, the US military bases overseas. There is no suggestion in the NSS that these would be shut down or that there would be any significant draw-down in the number of US troops stationed abroad.

    There are, as of now, over 1,60,000 US troops stationed in over 100 countries worldwide at 750 military sites. The most important overseas stations of US armed forces are in the ‘occupied’ countries of Germany, Japan, Italy and Korea (countries occupied by the US in the Second World War), member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and in the ‘client’ states of West Asia, especially Bahrain and Kuwait.

    The annual cost of maintaining these bases has been estimated variously as being between $50 billion and $60 billion. The NSS says nothing about reducing the number of troops or bases but is emphatic that there has to be a greater “burden-sharing”. The US wants NATO members, Japan, Korea and Gulf states to increase their defence spending by partly financing the presence of US armed forces on their territories.

    Neither President Trump nor any other American President since the Second World War has ever said that there is any longer any reason for the US forces to be stationed in other countries.

    While these forces are present in limited numbers in many countries, including in India, thanks to bilateral agreements, the fact is that the larger presence in some countries is linked to the outcome of the Second World War. US troops remain stationed in all the countries the US ‘liberated’ and ‘occupied’ at the end of the war.

    Trump’s NSS has not called for a retreat or a retrenchment from these territories. It merely asks these countries to pay up for the maintenance of the US forces they host. It is the classic mafia-style act of demanding ‘protection money’ for the ‘security’ offered against potential threats from other Big Powers.

    So, think about this — the US is willing to allow China and Russia to be powerful military machines in Europe and Asia so that the European and Asian neighbours of Russia and China would seek protection from these regional hegemons from the global hegemon, the United States. In what way is this US retrenchment?

    This will be Trump’s legacy and going forward, the 2020s will be defined by how the world and the US respond to what can best be described as Trumpism.
    (Sanjay Baru is a senior journalist)

  • The Trump NSS, Europe’s existential crisis

    The Trump NSS, Europe’s existential crisis

    With the Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy making it clear that American support to Europe is now faint, it remains to be seen how Europe responds

    By Priyanjali Malik

    Hope is not a strategy. For most of this year, European leaders have hoped that the Trump Administration has not actually meant its President’s oscillating support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), its Vice-President’s berating his European hosts in Munich over their liberal values and immigration policies, President Donald Trump’s tirade against migration at the United Nations, and of course his mercurial support for Ukraine. The hope was that, all things considered, America would ultimately stand with Europe.

    The Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy — a 33 page document that spends much time congratulating the President for saving America from apparently terminal decline as it charts an unapologetically MAGA-esque America-first mercantilist position — appears not to notice Africa, Australia and New Zealand. It sweeps by Asia as it focuses strongly on perceived trade imbalances with China and lands squarely on a defense of the ‘Western Hemisphere’ according to American interests while lamenting the decline of Europe. Europe is a problem, not an ally.

    The stand on Europe

    In ‘Promoting European Greatness’, the NSS warns of Europe’s ‘civilizational erasure’, precipitated by the European Union (EU)’s policies on migration and freedom of speech, ‘the suppression of political opposition’, and the ‘loss of national identities and self-confidence’. In case there was any doubt about which migrants were unwelcome, the NSS declares that if Europe continues on its present trajectory, ‘within a few decades … certain NATO members will become majority non-European.’ The U.S. will help Europe regain its ‘former greatness’ by choosing ‘patriotic European parties’ to promote what this administration views as ‘genuine democracy’ and ‘unapologetic celebrations of European nations’ individual character and history’. To most Europeans, at best this reads as a meddling in the internal politics of sovereign nations, and at worst as regime change.

    Europe, the NSS states, needs to stand on its own feet, assume ‘primary responsibility for its own defense’ and re-establish ‘strategic stability with Russia’. NATO ‘cannot be a perpetually expanding alliance’, a warning of course to Ukraine, but also an interesting glossing over of Sweden and Finland’s accession to the alliance after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. In this document, the threat is not Russia and its invasion of a sovereign nation, but Europe’s cultural decay. The tramp of the jackboots of 1930s Europe echoes with every mention of civilizational decline.

    Of course, an administration’s national security strategy is not policy, but a guide to its thinking. They can and have been over-ridden by events, most notably George H.W. Bush’s 1990 NSS, which was overtaken by the fall of the Berlin Wall, German reunification and the first Gulf War. Observers could chart the evolution of the administration’s thinking in the two subsequent iterations of 1991 and 1993.

    As a high-level document, the NSS often provides the lens through which to interpret an administration’s foreign policy goals and is assumed to set the tone for the administration’s national defense strategy, its Quadrennial Defense Review and national military strategy. Mr. Trump’s famously mercurial nature might caution against viewing it as declared policy. However, given that this is a Congress-mandated document, it is more than just a rhetorical exercise: while it should not be taken literally, it should be taken seriously.

    What Europe’s response could be

    As the dust settles, Europe now faces three options in responding: it can ignore the NSS and hope that it will go away; its leaders can dial up their flattery of Mr. Trump in the hope that he will change his mind on Europe; or Europe can face up to the prospect that Mr. Trump’s America is not a reliable ally and that they will need to fend for themselves.

    Europe tried a mixture of the first two strategies after J.D. Vance’s outburst at the Munich Security Conference. After some tepid talk of needing to pull together to see off Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ‘imperialist’ ambitions in trying to ‘rewrite history’ or the need for Europe to wean itself off U.S. dependence, Europe doubled down on doing whatever it would take to keep America in NATO and Europe. Britain flattered Mr. Trump with an invitation for an unprecedented second state visit. Germany’s Friedrich Merz forgot about his observations of February this year as Chancellor-in-waiting that his ‘absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe … so that … we can really achieve independence from the USA’.

    Germany has since abandoned half-explored plans of developing European capabilities and ordered more American military kit, which is dependent on American intelligence to work. NATO’s Hague Summit of June this year will be remembered as much for European states agreeing to raise their military spending to 5% of GDP as for Secretary-General Mark Rutte’s calling Mr. Trump ‘Daddy.’

    The third option will not be easy. Europe has never defended itself as an entity and there is no concept of integrated European defense. Even limited projects of joint development of military kit tend not to get very far, as the stalled Franco-German project on sixth generation fighter jets demonstrates. If the U.S. pulls American troops out of Europe — as this administration has periodically hinted it might do — then Europe will have a serious manpower problem that experiments in ‘voluntary’ conscription will not even begin to address. Then there is the question of nuclear deterrence and Britain’s uneasy post-Brexit relationship with the EU and Europe. 

    The state of the world order

    How Europe responds will have implications beyond the continent. Mr. Trump’s NSS, with its attack on transnational institutions (that he insists ‘undermine political liberty and sovereignty’), its dismantling of the post-war trading order in favor of a mercantilist America-first policy; and the signaling of a U.S. retreat into its own ‘Hemisphere’ (however that might be defined, and with the implication that China and Russia are free to carve up the rest of the world as long as they do not impinge on America’s trading footprint) have profound implications for the rest of the world. The post-war world order that America helped shape and uphold is imperfect and crumbling. The power imbalances at the United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions that help anchor expectations of peace, security, development and trade reflect an outdated world order. But, however imperfect this rules-based system might be, it is still a bulwark against a descent into a Hobbesian free-for-all, where might makes right.

    The debate about this National Security Strategy is, therefore, not about a document that might shed light on an administration’s thinking. It is about whether Europe chooses to defend a rules-based liberal order or defers to a President whose transactional and racist view of the world will have consequences that stretch far beyond his borders.

    (Priyanjali Malik writes on nuclear politics and security)