The plan can be seen in two ways – as a statement of intentions on how to end the Gaza war, or an instrument of surrender
Shortly before the second anniversary of Hamas’s attack on Israel (October 7, 2023), United States President Donald Trump unveiled his 20-point plan for a Gaza ceasefire. Hamas has reacted positively but has indicated that it will need to renegotiate parts of the plan. This has set the cat among the pigeons. Mr. Trump has hailed this as an opportunity to bring peace to West Asia while Israel is unhappy with the conditions attached to Hamas’ acceptance. Skepticism over progress on the plan is understandable given what happened in January this year when the ceasefire that was negotiated by U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, which was detailed, sequenced and agreed to by both sides, was torn up unilaterally by Israel after the first step. But this time around, all the major players, including Mr. Trump, want this plan to succeed as a last chance for peace in Gaza — except perhaps the Israel government.
In a nutshell
The 20 points include everything that the U.S. would like to see happen in Gaza in the foreseeable future; and, no, the Palestinian state is not one of them. The plan is at best a statement of intentions on how to end the Gaza war and bring normalcy to Palestinians in their destroyed land — and at worst, an instrument of surrender.
Except for one solitary timeline, where Israeli hostages would be released by Hamas within 72 hours of the ceasefire, everything else needs fleshing out to become a road map. The details of what should be done by the Palestinian side are spelt out — hostages (release within 72 hours); Hamas (disarm and/or quit Gaza); Palestinian Authority (reform or perish); governance of Gaza (deradicalization, demilitarization and technocrats’ rule under an International Board of Peace headed by Mr. Trump), and security (international destabilization force in Gaza). However, there are a few details of Israeli obligations (when does fighting stop), territory (how much will remain with Israel and till what time), and the future role of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) (no timelines for withdrawal from Gaza). Of course, the plan is silent on the West Bank.
The plan is designed to capitalize on the war fatigue of the Palestinians and pressure Hamas. Whether one agrees with its content or not, it covers aspects relating to security, economic development, governance and international involvement. Ethnic cleansing of Gaza has been ruled out. An international stabilization force could be a positive factor if the mandate is clear and regional and the other players involved play a committed role. Israel will get its security with a demilitarized Gaza and a disarmed and deradicalized Hamas.
Unfortunately, a lack of clarity on timelines and sequencing converts the framework into a mere statement of disjointed intentions rather than a credible pathway for withdrawal of Israel from Gaza and restoring normalcy. It is not even a full ceasefire deal since, under the plan, fighting can continue side by side with the implementation. This is what Hamas has serious reservations about. This infirmity could be fatal if the U.S. and major regional players do not do the heavy lifting vis-à-vis Israel. This is why Mr. Trump’s call to Israel to stop the bombing of Gaza is important. Of course, it is not as if Israel has listened to the U.S. now or in the past.
To state the obvious, the focus of the plan has been on the release of all Israeli hostages, dead or alive, since Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been under tremendous domestic pressure to get them released. Once that is done within 72 hours of the ceasefire, the only arbiters of Palestinian destiny become the U.S. and Israel, which is incidentally the reality now. Every progress, or the lack of, by the Palestinians towards fulfilling the conditionalities will be decided by these two. There is no monitoring mechanism.
Further, while the release of 250 Palestinian life prisoners and 1,700 Palestinian detainees in exchange for Israeli hostages is welcome, with the revolving door policy of Israel to arrest, imprison and release Palestinians at will, this stipulation in the plan may not have any practical value on the ground. To get a sense of this equation, at least 18,000 Palestinians have been arrested by Israel only in the West Bank since October 7, 2023.
Burden shifts to Hamas, the Palestinians
Given the above, this plan removes the international pressure on Israel on its daily killings in Gaza, by shifting the burden of stopping the war to the implementation of the plan by Hamas and the Palestinians. If they are seen not to implement it, then Israel’s continued presence in Gaza is legitimized and its continued attacks will be justified. When Mr. Netanyahu has declared that the IDF will remain in Gaza, entrusting Israel to decide on its exit from Gaza is a non-starter.
Effectively, the plan puts governance and security under international control through its Board of Peace and International Stabilization Force. This can be a potential stop-gap arrangement provided the regional players remain committed and, where necessary, not hesitate to use their clout with the U.S. to stop Israeli violations. So far, the involvement of the Gulf countries in the Gaza war has been minimal since they have given priority to diminishing the threat of Iran and its proxies, which Israel helped them achieve. They are equally reluctant to compromise their larger interests in the region i.e., the Abraham Accords, their military ties with the U.S. and a newfound Syrian bonhomie, on the altar of an elusive two-state solution.
Once Gaza comes under international control, the plan does not chart out any pathway to elections or to a representative governance structure except a possible reformed Palestinian Authority’s role sometime in the future. Ironically, the last legislative elections in the occupied territories, in 2006, were won by Hamas, which secured 44.45% of the vote share and 74 out of 132 seats, while Fatah won 41.43% and 45 seats. This led to a division in the Palestinian leadership and the eventual disconnect between Gaza and the West Bank. Now, the plan envisages a technocratic committee with ‘Palestinian and international experts’, with municipal jurisdiction working under international governance and a security framework, directly under Mr. Trump. Hamas had agreed to step aside from the governance of Gaza and to a Palestinian technocratic committee. But under this plan, the Palestinians will not control their future. Hamas has called this unacceptable and said that a decision on governance should be taken by broader Palestinian consensus in which Hamas will also participate.
More a rehashed ‘Riviera’ plan
The self-styled ‘Trump’ economic plan is possibly a rehash of the idea to make a ‘Riviera’ out of the Gaza seafront and build ‘modern miracle cities’ to pull 2.3 million Palestinians in Gaza out of poverty, while thousands in the West Bank are being uprooted from their cities, land and livelihood and driven to poverty.
Earlier, one had argued that process usually trumped substance for negotiating a Palestinian state. This time there is not even a process except a solitary reference to self-determination in the plan which, both the U.S. and Israel know, is a point so distant that it may never be reached. Mr. Netanyahu has sworn never to concede a Palestinian state. His far-right partners have sworn to annex the West Bank this year. Therefore, it is no surprise that the plan does not base itself on international law or United Nations Security Council resolutions or even the recent International Court of Justice judgment on the 1967 borders to establish a Palestinian state. In fact, it goes in the opposite direction.
Consequently, how long will the ceasefire hold after the exchange of hostages? If it does not, how much capital will the U.S. and Gulf players spend to restrain Israel from further attacks? The larger question of the Palestine state has been set aside — as it has been time and again. The rapidly changing ground realities in the West Bank, with marauding Israeli settlement construction and eviction of Palestinians from their land, is now out of the syllabus.
[T.S. Tirumurti was Ambassador/Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations, New York (2020-22) and the first Representative of India to the Palestinian Authority in Gaza (1996-98)]
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