A full account of how much water India is losing because of the Indus treaty should be made public by the government
“The IWT was negotiated with the help of the World Bank. The process took nine years. India generously gave Pakistan waters of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab (called the western rivers in the treaty). It only retained the right to use a small portion of their waters for irrigation and run-of-the-river power generation. India retained full use of the Ravi, Sutlej and Beas. That meant that its “share” of the waters of the Indus Rivers System (IRS) remained only 20 per cent; the rest was given up to Pakistan.”

During an interaction with students of IIT-Madras on January 2, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar turned his attention to India’s “bad neighbor to the west”. He made the valid point that India had the right to defend its people against a country which perpetrated terrorism “deliberately, persistently and unrepentantly”.
He went on to emphasize that it was up to India to decide how it would “exercise that right”. He recalled that “many years ago”, India had, as a measure of goodwill, agreed to a “water-sharing arrangement” with the western neighbor. However, as Pakistan had been involved in terrorism against India over the decades, it could not ask for sharing of waters. Jaishankar was essentially reiterating Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s point that “blood and water cannot flow together”.
Both Modi’s and Jaishankar’s comments relate to the river waters that flow from India to Pakistan. Both are general expressions of anger and dismay against Pakistan’s pursuit of cross-border terrorism. However, they lack specificity and precision. They also do not take into account to what extent India can control the rivers that flow from India to Pakistan.
The “water-sharing arrangement” is the India-Pakistan Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960. Pakistan had from the outset raised the apprehension that India had the capacity to deny it water. This is because the rivers that sustained life in Pakistan — Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej — flowed through India and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) before entering its territory.
Pakistan’s fears were unfounded because in the case of the Indus, Jhelum and to a large extent Chenab, India simply could not, wholly or substantially, hold back their waters. That was true then and it is so now as well. India could stop the waters of the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej from flowing into Pakistan, but they hold only 20 per cent of the waters of these six rivers taken together. Hence, Pakistan’s real desire was that India should not impede the flow of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. The waters issue was also used in Pakistan to fuel anti-India sentiment.
The IWT was negotiated with the help of the World Bank. The process took nine years. India generously gave Pakistan waters of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab (called the western rivers in the treaty). It only retained the right to use a small portion of their waters for irrigation and run-of-the-river power generation. India retained full use of the Ravi, Sutlej and Beas. That meant that its “share” of the waters of the Indus Rivers System (IRS) remained only 20 per cent; the rest was given up to Pakistan.
India has held the IWT in abeyance since the Pahalgam terror attack in April last year. Earlier, in September-October 2024, there were reports that India had asked Pakistan for a renegotiation of the treaty because the situation concerning the use of waters and the generation of power had changed since 1960. Pakistan had responded by suggesting that the matter be raised in the India-Pakistan Indus Waters Commission under the IWT. India had rejected this approach. It wanted a Pakistani commitment for renegotiating the treaty. Now, this has become academic because India has held the treaty in abeyance. Pakistan has warned that restricting the flow of water into its territory would be “an act of war”, but it’s unlikely that the threat would prevent India from undertaking actions to use the IRS’s waters where it can for the benefit of its people.
The terrain through which the Indus flows in India before it enters PoK is such that a large dam cannot be constructed. Certainly, its waters cannot be diverted meaningfully in Ladakh or elsewhere. Large dams cannot be constructed on the Jhelum too. But its waters can be used for navigation, and limited irrigation possibilities exist.
Pakistan prevented the construction of the Tulbul Navigation Project for decades. Now it can be completed. The IWT has always been unpopular in J&K because it circumscribes the use of the erstwhile state’s rivers. The Chenab can be utilized for power generation and perhaps its water can be diverted for irrigation, but dams with large pondages cannot be constructed because of the terrain. And, the eastern rivers are with India in any case.
All in all, it is difficult to foresee how India can utilize the waters of the western rivers in large measure beyond what is already provided in the IWT. Hence, can India really trouble Pakistan through restricting the flow of river waters? Perhaps not. In any event, a full account of how much water India is losing because of the IWT should be made public by the government.
Pakistan has followed an obstructive approach to the IWT and desperately wants it to continue. The reasons are two-fold. First: it does not wish to lose even a small quantity of water because it has become a water-scarce country. Pakistan’s water management has been terrible, but it does not wish to acknowledge this fact. Second: Pakistan does not want India to ever disrupt the flow of water, especially during the agricultural season, because that may negatively impact crop yields.
Pakistan has agreed to discuss the IWT modification, although under the Indus Waters Commission, because it may feel that India would not agree to use the mechanism for these discussions.
However, there is a section in Pakistan which wants to engage India in sub-surface water management. This section believes that India and Pakistan share aquifers and that their joint management would benefit Pakistan. They would like the IWT to extend to sub-surface waters too. India should never agree to expand the scope of cooperation to sub-soil water in view of Pakistan’s obstructionism in IWT management.
India is both an upper riparian state and a lower one, as in the case of the Brahmaputra. This reinforces the need for the government to provide greater clarity to the comments Modi and Jaishankar have made on sharing of waters. People deserve not to be confused on vital issues such as water.
(Vivek Katju is a retired Indian Foreign Service officer.)














