Judicial wisdom, political mischief

“It needs to be noted that the Supreme Court ruling is a very limited intervention in the Muslim “religion” — limited only to a very obnoxious practice; the practice was held unacceptable by the court because it is in violation of the Islamic laws. In any case, progressive, liberal and sensitive voices within the Muslim community have consistently voiced themselves against the obnoxiousness of this practice of instant triple talaq”, says the author.

A socially useful litigation, insisted upon by those intrepid women of the Bharatiya Muslim Mahila Andolan, has produced a Supreme Court ruling, invalidating the practice of instant triple talaq. Lest it be suggested that the court had adjusted itself to the political expediencies of the day, we were curiously but repeatedly told that the judgment was delivered by a Bench that represented five different religious faiths. That was somehow meant to reassure us all. Still, that did not prevent the assorted politicians, from the Prime Minister downward, from overloading the verdict with their political calculations. Some wise and clever RSS functionary was even reported to have pronounced the death of “old secularism.”

Consequently, we are forced to examine the political context of this consequential judgment. It needs to be noted that the talaq ruling has come soon after we recently courted an elaborate controversy over the Hamid Ansari proposition that the minorities in India had been given reason to feel insecure. Authoritative and angry voices were raised: how dare anyone bring up this disagreeable subject of the minorities’ welfare and insecurity?  The rebuff was laced with a be-grateful-for-what-you-are-allowed-to-have smugness.

Legal scholars will keep chewing on the jurisprudential nuances of three sets of opinion, the larger question that needs to concern us is: how will the triple talaq ruling add to — or subtract from — the minorities’ sense of insecurity?  True, the honorable judges were not addressing themselves to the minorities’ (in)security but there can be no doubt that this ruling will have complications and consequences in the larger political landscape.

To begin with, there may be cases of stray Muslim men being criminalized for being in violation of the Supreme Court. The very lumpen elements who had inflicted violence in the name of cow protection would feel emboldened to rework their gruesome energy. The use of violence and aggression against the minorities can now be explained away as sanctioned by the highest court.

Some voices are already asserting that the ruling is the beginning of the end of what they see as the jumped-up insolence of the Muslims. Others are insisting that the politics of “appeasement” that began with the Shah Bano case three decades ago stands rolled back. This assertion of “appeasement” has been central to the ideological concoction served up by the Hindutva forces; it was meant to denigrate the non-BJP forces and to create certain visceral resentment, inducing a grievance that the majority remains at a clear disadvantage “in our own land”. So, unsurprisingly, the talaq judgment is deemed to be a political statement.

It needs to be noted that the Supreme Court ruling is a very limited intervention in the Muslim “religion” — limited only to a very obnoxious practice; the practice was held unacceptable by the court because it is in violation of the Islamic laws. In any case, progressive, liberal and sensitive voices within the Muslim community have consistently voiced themselves against the obnoxiousness of this practice of instant triple talaq. So, why this dismay or jubilation?

Arguably, the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion does not constitute a blanket protection; nor are the minorities entitled to feel totally beyond the reach of the court’s jurisdiction.  Religious practices and customs can be challenged; and, in each case a determination is to be made by the court whether a practice is essential to the religion. In this limited context, the Muslim community need not allow itself to feel particularly cornered. Yet it is easier said than done.

Because, on the other hand, there is a sense of satisfaction, even triumphalism, that the Muslims can no longer claim to be beyond the interventionist reach of the State; just as the majority has been repeatedly subjected to —remember the Hindu Marriage Act, the sati, dowry, etc. — the progressive gaze of the law, now the same light of reasoned enlightenment would be focused on the minorities. The hardcore constituency can permit itself a smirk that the Muslims have lost an ill-deserved immunity. A beachhead has been established.

Indeed, the Hindutva forces have not lost any time in asserting that the triple talaq ruling is only the beginning; and that its old demand for a uniform civil code remains unabandoned. That demand itself is part of an unfinished agenda on what terms of co-existence are to be offered to the Muslims/minorities in India — parity, equality, or subordination.

That will be the stuff of politics in the months and years to come. Make no mistake about it. Given the BJP’s current political ascendency, the minorities may well be within reason to feel that the ruling party is out to question every single assurance or commitment, even overturn constitutional guarantees. Indeed, the orthodox leadership of the Muslim community may feel besieged but it would be a pity if the maulanas were to spurn the opportunity to raise their game.

Perhaps the most beneficial side-effect of the triple talaq ruling is that the Supreme Court has reclaimed its status and aura as the principal and only institutional interpreter of the constitutional rights and wrongs. The privacy case verdict on Thursday should be seen as a natural follow-up of the triple talaq verdict. A robust judiciary is central to the restoration of liberal sanity to our polity.

Those who swear by progressive and liberal values and profess a commitment to secularism and pluralism have an obligation, post-Talaq ruling, to devise new political tactics. It needs to be recognized that the old-fashioned identity politics is becoming increasingly counterproductive. If the orthodox Muslim leadership were to insist on wallowing in its entrenched ill-liberalism of the status quo, it will only enhance the potency of ill-liberalism of the right wing. It is no rocket science that the BJP’s politics is predicated on creating hostility among groups and suspicion in society at large.

Secular political parties and leaders have to give the Muslim community the confidence to grow out of the maulanas’ sway. The apex court has anchored its verdict on universal moral values; and, the same values can be invoked to insist a fair deal for the minorities in a fair constitutional order, creating “a good society”.

Before he went rogue in Vietnam, President Lyndon Johnson had defined “a good society” as one in which all citizens and groups “expect justice for themselves and are willing to grant it to others”.  Liberal, democratic and secular voices need to seize the talaq judgment to insist on a renewal of the constitutional core guarantees.

(The author is the editor-in-chief of Tribune group of newspapers)

Donald Trump’s plan for Afghanistan is still too short on specifics

U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to deepen the country’s military engagement in war-torn Afghanistan signals a significant shift in the position he has held for years. Mr. Trump had campaigned to end American involvement in foreign conflicts and was particularly critical of the Afghan war, which he said was “wasting” American money. His announcement on Monday of the decision to send more troops to the country reflects a realization that the U.S. does not have many options in dealing with its longest military conflict. This is also a grim reminder of the precarious security situation in Afghanistan. Sixteen years since George W. Bush ordered the American invasion of Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban regime, the insurgents are on the ascendant again. More than half the country’s territory, mostly in rural, mountainous areas, is now controlled by the Taliban, while the Islamic State has set up base in eastern Afghanistan. In recent years, both the Taliban and the IS have carried out a number of terror attacks in the country, including at highly fortified military locations, raising questions about the very survival of the government in Kabul. This is a worry point for Mr. Trump’s generals, who want to avoid the kind of vacuum left behind by the Soviet withdrawal in the late 1980s that plunged Afghanistan into a protracted civil war; the Taliban eventually took over.

But it is not going to be easy for Mr. Trump. He is the third consecutive American President to send troops to Afghanistan. Mr. Bush and Barack Obama failed to swing the situation sufficiently to ensure a long-lasting difference in Afghanistan’s battleground. It is not clear if Mr. Trump can win a war they lost. His strategy can be summed up as Obama-plus — it builds on the premises of the Obama plan of additional troops and regional diplomacy. But unlike Mr. Obama, who set a timetable for the withdrawal of troops, Mr. Trump is ready for an open-ended engagement. He also said the focus of the American mission should narrow down to fighting terrorists, not rebuilding Afghanistan “in our own image”. Third, Mr. Trump minced no words while calling Pakistan a country that shelters terrorists. He also wants India to play a greater role in providing economic and developmental assistance to Afghanistan. India has welcomed Mr. Trump’s strategy, as the U.S.’s objectives in building a stable Afghanistan and ending Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism are exactly in line with India’s own goals for the region. It has, however, correctly reminded Mr. Trump that it does not need his request, never mind his coarse reference to “billions of dollars” made in bilateral trade with the U.S., in order to fulfil its commitment to Afghanistan’s economic development. Such open transactionalism will not serve the U.S.’s efforts in winning allies for its new Afghanistan policy, nor indeed will it further its mission in a country that is not unfairly called the “graveyard of empires”.

(The Hindu)

“Trump’s remarks on Pakistan and India are of obvious importance. A strong pillar of the new strategy, he declared, is to change the approach towards Pakistan. “We can no longer be silent about Pakistan’s safe havens to terrorist organizations”. Pakistan “has much to gain by partnering American efforts in Afghanistan” and much to lose by “continuing to harbor criminals and terrorists”. He did not specify what he would do if Pakistan did not cooperate, but hinted at a cut in economic aid when he stated: “We have been paying billions and billions of dollars at the same time they have been housing the very terrorists we have been fighting”, says the author.

President Trump revealed his long-awaited strategy for Afghanistan in a prime time speech on national television on August 21. He called it “the path forward in Afghanistan and South Asia”, the first President to so describe it. The timing of the speech was selected, at least partly, to divert attention from the widespread criticism, including by senior leaders from his own party as well as from top business magnates, for his remarks on the Charlottesville happenings. He might have succeeded to some extent in this objective.

In outlining his approach, he took a 180-degree turn and departed from his long-held and oft-repeated position demanding immediate withdrawal from Afghanistan. He was conscious of that and had the political courage to reverse his stand by not only not deciding to pull out but even announcing an increase in US troop strength. He was conscious of the American people’s strong aversion to sending more troops in harm’s way in faraway Afghanistan. He ignored the advice of Steve Bannon, the ultra conservative and his chief strategic adviser until last week when Bannon was pushed out. He did not mention any figures, though the number 4,000 has been talked. He declared an open-ended commitment, regarding numbers and the time period for troops to remain in Afghanistan.

He specifically criticized Barack Obama’s unwise decision to announce the withdrawal date and to reduce the request for additional troops by 25 per cent —30,000 instead of 40,000.  Trump has embraced the military’s advice of making the continued stay of troops “conditions-based”, instead of time-based. Before Obama’s speech at West Point, there was intense debate about “time bound” versus “conditions based”, but he made a grave error by taking the time-bound approach. Trump also criticized Obama for pulling out of Iraq in 2011, leaving a vacuum which was exploited by the Islamic State. However, Obama had very little choice in the matter since the Iraqi government and Parliament refused to sign the “Status of Forces Agreement” which was a must for the administration to station troops in a foreign country on a long-time basis.

In addition to the “conditions-based” approach, Trump assured the military that it will have the resources and operational freedom, including deciding on the rules of engagement, to make the new strategy “work, and work effectively, and work quickly”. This is somewhat on the lines of the Modi government’s carte blanche to the Army to use whatever force is deemed essential to deal with cross-border terrorist attacks. In both cases, time alone will tell if and to what extent the desired result will ensue.

Trump made it abundantly clear that his strategy demanded identifiable and effective action by the Afghan government. The heaviest burden will be borne by the “good people” of Afghanistan and their armed forces. Categorically ruling out “democracy building” or “nation building”, he made it clear that “our commitment is not unlimited and our support is not a blank check.” He demanded that the Afghan government must carry its share of the military, political and economic burden. He made no mention of the other players — China, Russia and Iran. These three countries have their own strategic interests in Afghanistan, not coinciding with America’s. But they have conflicting concerns. On the one hand, they would be quite happy if America remains bogged down in Afghanistan, bleeding resources. At the same time, they would like to see America pull out completely which would leave the field clear for them to meddle more effectively in Afghanistan. All the three are reportedly in touch with, and even aiding, the Taliban.

For us, Trump’s remarks on Pakistan and India are of obvious importance. A strong pillar of the new strategy, he declared, is to change the approach towards Pakistan. “We can no longer be silent about Pakistan’s safe havens to terrorist organizations”. Pakistan “has much to gain by partnering American efforts in Afghanistan” and much to lose by “continuing to harbor criminals and terrorists”. He did not specify what he would do if Pakistan did not cooperate, but hinted at a cut in economic aid when he stated: “We have been paying billions and billions of dollars at the same time they have been housing the very terrorists we have been fighting”. This is an unmistaken reference to the earlier refuge to Osama bin Laden and sanctuary to the Haqqani terror network. “That will have to change and change immediately”, he said. “It is time for Pakistan to demonstrate its commitment to civilization, order and peace”.

Strong words pleasing to Indian ears. One will have to wait and see how much, if at all, Trump’s warning will bring a change in Pakistan’s Afghan policy. Trump’s speech also brings out, unambiguously, that the success of his new strategy will depend to a large extent on Pakistan’s cooperation. This will give considerable leverage to Pakistan that can always depend on the Pentagon which has consistently had a soft corner for the Pakistan army and decides US policy in Afghanistan, like its Pakistani counterpart.

Trump has made positive references to India, “the world’s largest democracy and a key security and economic partner of United States”. Developing a strategic partnership with India will be a ‘critical’ part of the new South Asia strategy. True to his style, he pointed out that India “makes billions of dollars in trade with United States”, and must do more in Afghanistan, especially in economic assistance and development. Clearly hinting at China, the President spoke of “our shared objectives for peace and security in South Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region”. We need not get too flattered by Trump’s remarks about India; he will demand a price for all that India seeks from the US in terms of technology transfers and that is as it should be. We will have to calculate how much money to spend in Afghanistan, in addition to the $2 billion already invested.  In all fairness, our help has generated friendly feelings among the Afghan people for India. We have huge interest in ensuring that the Taliban does not come to power either by themselves or as a part of a coalition for which Pakistan has been working for long. We do not want hordes of Taliban descending on Kashmir. But it is highly doubtful if Trump’s so-called new Afghanistan South Asia strategy — shades of Af-Pak-India of Holbrooke’s original mandate? — will prevent, and for how long, the Taliban getting at least a share in power in Kabul.

(The author is India’s former Permanent Representative to the UN)